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Abstract
In this thesis we propose an agent-based model for a financial market with a
single asset. The agents are motivated to trade via their personal beliefs about the
future direction of the asset price moves. Additionally, the trades are restricted by
the resources available to agents. The constructed model is used to attempt to gain
some insight into the origin of large price moves in the market (“market crashes”).
Monte Carlo simulations are used to study model behaviour under varying initial
conditions. The model is found to be generally capable of reproducing the stylised
facts of real financial markets. The ubiquity of relatively high incidence of large
price moves in the results of model simulation, together with results from similar
models by other authors allow us to conjecture that such moves are inherent in a
market model based on a heterogenous population of intelligent agents. Finally,
several directions for model improvement are identified.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The exchange market is a very interesting socio-economic phenomenon. It is fun-
damentally important, as it provides the mechanism for redistribution of the re-
sources in the society, it involves the interactions between a number of people, thus
necessarily reflecting their individual differences and peculiarities, yet at the same
time the state of a market can be described quantitatively, in terms of prices and
volumes traded, composition of demand and supply and so on. It is little wonder
therefore that numerous attempts to model the workings of an exchange market
mathematically have been made. The sheer complexity of modelling an interactive
system of this kind means that some modelling simplifications are usually neces-
sary.
In the specific case of a market of financial instruments, where numbers of par-
ticipants are large and liquidity may be assumed to be present most of the time,
it makes sense to disregard the impact of an individual trade on the market. In
fact, in solving an optimal problem (be it pricing, hedging or asset allocation) from
an individual perspective it is perfectly reasonable to forego modelling the actual
impact all the other market participants have and simply take the evolution of
market in time (expressed in terms of the most recent trade price) to be a stochas-
tic process.
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This approach can be quite fruitful in certain situations. To see why this is the
case, it is helpful to first imagine oneself in a position of an individual trader, too
small to influence the market price by one’s own actions, effectively a price-taker.
Clearly one cannot possibly hope to know the intentions and capabilities of the
other market participants, so second-guessing the actions of others does not appear
to be an attractive proposition in this case. Essentially, the market moves appear
random to the trader. It would then seem reasonable that the market price of the
asset may be modelled as a random variable evolving in time, that is, a stochastic
process.
One can then try to determine what this process is. Note, however, that the state-
ment “price is a stochastic process” is largely useless to someone who trades the
actual asset in question. Trading an asset is essentially driven by a belief about its
future market price, thus, if one believes that the asset price will double in a year’s
time one will endeavour to buy as many units as one can afford. The realised profit
(or loss) in this case will not depend on the particular form of the stochastic model
for the price of the asset, but rather on whether or not the initial belief was correct.
Situation is somewhat different when we are dealing with the trading of derivative
securities, i.e. those whose value is a function of the some “basic” or underlying
asset. In fact, the problem of derivative pricing (and hedging) is the prime reason
for the existence of the modern mathematical finance framework. The key element
of this framework is the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, which essentially
states that the assumption of no arbitrage in the market, that is, that there is no
possibility of making a riskless profit with zero initial cost, is equivalent to the ex-
istence of a probability measure in which the (discounted) prices of all contingent
claims are martingales. In order to apply this theorem we usually begin by spec-
ifying the price processes for the underlying assets so that they are martingales
under some pricing measure. The price of a derivative contract is then found as
a conditional expectation of its future payoff, whose functional form is known in
advance as it usually specified in the contract. The details of how this approach is
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actually applied in practice can be very complicated, but the basic idea is always
the same.
Another area in which stochastic process modelling is used extensively is risk
modelling. Here the goal is to to derive the profit/loss distribution for a given
portfolio of financial securities over some time horizon. The chief motivation is to
be able to place some kind of estimate on the amount of money that could be lost
by the portfolio in adverse circumstances, so there is a special emphasis on the
“loss” tail of the distribution.
It may seem logical to simply carry over the stochastic process approach outlined
above and apply it to risk modelling. But herein lies a principal difficulty. Since
we are interested in the tails of the profit/loss distribution and the value of our
portfolio will always depend on market prices, we may be particularly interested in
market crashes, i.e. in price moves whose magnitude significantly exceeds the av-
erage historical price deviation over a comparable time period. 1 Now, suppose we
start out with a stochastic process model that predicts crashes of given magnitude
with certain frequency. However, we very quickly accumulate statistically signifi-
cant empirical evidence that the actual frequency of such events is much higher,
perhaps many orders of magnitude higher. Clearly we cannot continue to use the
same model for the purposes of risk modelling - it will be dangerously misleading.
The next step then seems obvious - we need to augment our model in such a way
as to produce crashes with frequency that is more in line with reality. But even
if we assume some form of stationarity of the price process this solution has an
obvious weakness - we can never know for certain whether all its features have
been revealed. Therefore we can never exclude the possibility that we are missing
something important - recall that it is the “tail” properties of the distribution
that we are interested in and those may take a very long time to establish. The
1Although the term “market crash” is commonly associated with extreme downward moves,
particularly where the stock market is concerned, we are generally interested in extreme price
moves in both directions, since, depending on the position taken by the market participant both
upward and downward price moves can lead to financial loss.
16
situation is even worse: even our assumption of stationarity is wrong - in this case
we would simply be reacting to the changes in the nature of stochastic process,
always lagging behind with our estimate.
The most interesting question here is whether there is anything we can do about
this somewhat unfortunate state of affairs. Of course, it is highly unlikely we would
ever be able to predict the future - but luckily this is not our goal. The goal is
simply to obtain the distribution of price changes (and consequently of changes in
portfolio value). One way to do this would be to look deeper into the “structure”
of the financial market, to try to understand how is it that trades occur and what
drives such occurrences. In other words we may try to construct a model for the
market beginning from individual participants and their interactions and working
our way upwards. Such investigation of “behind-the-scenes” workings of a market
may enable us to identify the factors that make a market susceptible to crashes
for instance. It is worth stressing once more that this would in no way constitute
a prediction of a crash, but it will hopefully give us enough information to say
something about the distribution of future price changes. We will now look at
the ways of modelling interaction between market participants (usually known as
“agent-based” models) in more detail.
Chapter 2
Agent-Based Complexity in
Markets
The idea to model financial market dynamics through a bottom-up approach has
been around for some time now. It usually goes under the name of “complexity”
(in financial markets), see e.g. Mantegna and Stanley (2007), Johnson et al. (2003).
We will now look at some of the general issues this approach raises, as well as some
research directions that could be taken in dealing with it.
2.1 Why Complexity?
The key point of the bottom-up approach is the explicit modelling of the large
number of agents interacting with each other. Furthermore, the agents determine
their actions with respect to the environment, which in turn is affected by their
actions. Needless to say, the resulting system is quite difficult to treat analytically.
This, of course, raises the question of simplifying the model with the hope that
this simplification will yield some useful insights. On the other hand, one may
argue that complexity is the distinguishing feature of the model and getting rid
of it is counter-productive. The main question we are facing therefore is this: how
much of the complexity in the model can be reduced without compromising its
utility?
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The question is by no means simple. We can try to start answering it by first
considering a simple, yet illustrative example of a situation in which agent-based
modelling is important. This is is the so-called El-Farol bar problem, first de-
scribed in Arthur (1999) (here cited from Johnson et al. (2003)). The problem
is as follows: suppose there is a popular bar (the El-Farol bar in Santa Fe in the
original paper) and that you have to decide whether you should attend on a given
night of the week. The idea here is that you wish to turn up, provided you can get
a seat. The trouble is, there are also other people (say, N is total) all trying to
do the same thing, and the bar does not have sufficient seating capacity to accom-
modate all of them at the same time. So clearly, your optimal actions depend on
what other people do. The main difficulty here, as well as in all complexity-related
problems is that it is either impossible or impractical for you to find out exactly
what it is other people are going to do.
We can use this simple problem to discuss relative utility of certain modelling
approaches to complexity. For instance, it is clear that we cannot model the dy-
namic behaviour of this system by using any kind of representative-agent frame-
work, since any action selected from a representative point of view will turn out
to be wrong - if the representative action is “stay at home” nobody will turn up
at the bar even though here will be free seats there. If, on the other hand, the
representative action is “go to the bar” the bar will be overcrowded. Similarly,
there is no point in trying to see what happens as the number of agents tends to
infinity (i.e. if we have a “continuum” of agents). In this case, if we believe that
there is a non-zero probability of an agent turning up at the bar, infinite number
of agents means that the bar will be always full with probability 1.
Thus emerges a fundamental property of complex agent-based systems: if we are
to obtain any non-trivial results, we must treat them as N -agent based systems.
Trying to reduce the complexity of the model by reducing the number of agents
(or by letting it tend to infinity) serves no purpose whatsoever.
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The discussion above leads us to a very important property of complex systems,
namely that the complexity in such systems cannot be completely reduced. This
is perhaps best understood in the context of the scientific discipline in which the
notion of complexity first arose, i.e. physics. Strictly speaking, all physical models
describe complex systems. However, in classical physics, the complexity is mostly
irrelevant. For instance, we know that atomic level interactions between the con-
stituent particles of celestial bodes have no bearing on gravitational forces acting
between those bodies. Thus it is possible to model gravity without any need for a
complete “bottom-up” model of celestial bodies.
The question here is whether it is always possible to reduce the complexity of
a system being modelled. The concept of criticality (originating in the study of
phase transitions in statistical physics) turns out to be quite important in this
context. Broadly speaking, a system can be described as critical if we can observe
that simple laws acting at the microscopic level can produce complex macroscopic
behaviour, with long-range correlations and self-similarity. A very important prop-
erty of critical systems is that a small perturbance at the “micro” level can lead to
significant changes of behaviour at the “macro” level. It is clear therefore that the
complexity of critical systems cannot be completely reduced, and that we do have
to model micro-level interactions when we are dealing with them. A detailed dis-
cussion of criticality in physics and other natural sciences can be found in Sornette
(2006).
2.2 Modelling Complexity
We begin by noting that there are obvious similarities between the workings of a
financial market and the El-Farol bar problem outlined above. The market partic-
ipants seek to make profits by trading (buying and selling) securities. The profit
arises from the positive difference between the selling price and the buying price.
Those prices however can only be provided by other market participants. In other
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words, the result of one’s actions depends on the actions of other agents in the
system and there is no way of knowing in advance what those actions might be.
Furthermore, every action taken by agent immediately impacts the market. It is
clear therefore that we are dealing with agent-based complexity here.
Of course, agent-based models of market complexity have been proposed before.
These usually start by postulating the existence of some finite number of agents in
the market and proposing a model for their interactions. The most basic require-
ment that such a model must satisfy is that the statistical properties of the price
process that emerges from it conform to the so-called “stylised facts” (SF) of the
markets. This is a set of qualitative properties of the time series of price-changes1
, usually taken to be (see Johnson et al. (2003))
 (SF1) fat-tailed distribution functions of price-changes
 (SF2) slow decay of the autocorrelation of absolute values of price-changes
(volatility clustering)
 (SF3) fast decay of the autocorrelation of values of price-changes
It is worth noting in passing that while the majority of studies that deal the statis-
tical properties of real-world markets concentrate on the well-developed European
and US financial markets, the stylised facts discussed here can be found in other
settings as well. For instance Yan et al. (2005) indicates that power-laws in the
tails of the log-return distribution are present in the Chinese stock markets, per-
haps suggesting that this phenomenon might be more widespread than one might
initially imagine.
Note that the list of stylised facts above is not meant to be used as a strict test of
model “correctness”. One cannot claim that a market model that generates a price
process with the above properties is a good representation of reality. However if
1Here and throughout this document we take “price change” to mean “log price change”, that
is lnXt+1 − lnXt, where X is the market price. This is standard practice in finance.
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a model does not conform to the stylised facts, there is clearly something wrong
with it, so the conformance does provide some confidence in the model.
Of course, these agent-based models do not stop at just reproducing the stylised
facts - otherwise there would be no point in their existence, since stochastic pro-
cesses that exhibit the required statistical properties can be also found. An agent-
based model should attempt to explain why certain features of market dynamics
occur by examining what it is going on “behind the scenes”. The particular aspect
of agent interactions and/or market functioning that the model concentrates on
also determines the simplifying assumptions it makes.
2.2.1 El-Farol model
The “El-Farol” (or Minority Game) market model discussed in Johnson et al.
(2003) deals with the way market agents change their strategies over time, how
clusters of opinions form and which agents ultimately “win” in the market. It
is assumed that agents make trading decisions in response to the signal repre-
sented by a recent history of market prices (of some finite depth). To simplify
analytical treatment of this problem, the price signal is represented in binary form
(up/down), and the trading decision is also binary (buy/sell). Each agent is then
assumed to posses a “strategy book” which maps price histories of binary signal of
some fixed length m to a trading decision. These books are different for different
agents leading to a heterogeneous population. It is further assumed that each buy
or sell action corresponds to buying or selling 1 unit of the traded asset. The
difference between the number of buying and selling agents at each time-step is
the excess demand in the market, and the resulting price change is modelled as a
linear function of the excess demand. Each agent is assumed to possess a limited
subset of all possible strategies (allocated randomly at the start), and the decision
to pick a particular strategy is made based on the comparison of performance be-
tween the strategies available, applied to recent market moves.
Simulations show that this rather simple model is able to reproduce the stylised
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facts of the markets quite accurately. It also provides some insight into the pos-
sible origin of the variation in price volatility observed in the market. Recall that
all agents have finite-length memories, that is, they consider a finite-length string
of ’bits’ (up/down market moves) when they decide on the strategy to follow.
When this finite length is small, a large number of agents is likely to choose the
same strategy as their best (since there are not many strategies to choose from),
producing crowding in the market, and, consequently large swings in excess de-
mand. If the agents’ memories are longer, however, the strategies chosen tend to
be more diverse, reducing the crowding effect. Clearly, this is not something that
can be taken a definite explanation of the origin of variation of volatility in the
markets, but it is an interesting observation, as well as a good example of the kind
of additional insight agent-based models can provide.
2.2.2 Chartist-Fundamentalist Models
A slightly different example of an approach to agent-based complexity can be found
in the Lux-Marchesi model (Lux and Marchesi (2000)). Here instead of consid-
ering generic strategies of the kind we saw in the El-Farol model, there are two
specific trading strategy types: chartist and fundamentalist. Chartist strategies
are further subdivided into optimistic and pessimistic types. The actions dictated
by the strategies are quite simple: agents following the chartist strategy either buy
or sell a fixed number of units of the traded asset, while fundamentalist strategy
stipulates that the asset has some fundamental price pf , and that the asset should
be bought when its market price is below pf and sold when it is above pf . The
key feature of the model, and the source of its dynamic properties, is the ability
of the agents to switch between different strategies. The strategy-switching occurs
in a probabilistic manner. For instance the switching between optimistic and pes-
simistic versions of the chartist strategy is influenced by two factors: the prevailing
majority opinion and the correspondence between the current market trend (mea-
sured by an approximation to the instantaneous price change pt − pt−1) and the
prescription of the strategy. The greater the proportion of chartists that adhere to
an optimistic strategy, the greater the probability of a pessimistic chartist switch-
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ing to an optimistic one and vice-versa. The probability of switching to a different
type of chartist strategy will also increase if the sign of the current market trend
disagrees with the one implied by the strategy held. Switching between chartist
and fundamentalist strategies is slightly more involved: here agents compare the
(myopic) profits derived from the two strategy types. The size of the pay-off differ-
ential between the chartist and the fundamentalist strategy types then determines
the probability of switching.
Once the numbers of agents following each type of strategy is determined, the
excess demand in the market is calculated as
ED = (n+ − n−)tc + γ(pf − p)nf (2.2.2.1)
where n+ and n− correspond to the size of optimistic and pessimistic chartist
populations respectively, tc is the chartist order size and γ is the reaction strength
parameter of the fundamentalist trader population. Finally the price change is
determined by the excess demand as follows:
P (p = p− + δp) = β(ED + µ)
+ (2.2.2.2)
P (p = p− − δp) = β(ED + µ)− (2.2.2.3)
where p− is the market price prior to adjustment, δp is a fixed positive price in-
crement, β is a reaction speed coefficient and µ is a noise term.
Similarly to the El-Farol market model the Lux-Marchesi model is able to repli-
cate the stylised facts in simulations. An additional interesting observation is that
volatility bursts observed in the model appear to be strongly correlated with the
fraction of chartists in the agent population - a high proportion of chartist strate-
gies corresponds to increased volatility.
Another example of the chartist-fundamentalist model was presented in Alfi et al.
(2008). There the aim was to create an agent-based model with minimal amount
of features that would still be able to reproduce the stylised facts. To that end,
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several simplifications (as compared to Lux-Marchesi model, for example) have
been introduced. Thus, there is only one kind of chartist strategy now, responding
positively to a signal formed by the difference between the current market price
and the moving average (of fixed lengthM) of recent market prices. In other words
the chartist strategy in this model is effectively trend-following. The fundamental-
ist strategy is unchanged - it prescribes buying when the market price is below the
fundamental price and selling otherwise. The numbers of agents in the chartist and
fundamentalist categories determine excess demand, which in turn translates into
price changes in a linear fashion (augmented with iid normal random variables).
Formally, the price dynamics in the model is given by
p(t+ 1)− p(t) = σξ + bp(t)− pM(t)
M − 1 nc + γ(pf − p(t))nf (2.2.2.4)
where the first term is white noise, while the second and third terms represent
the contribution of chartist and fundamentalist strategies respectively. Note that
nc and nf in (2.2.2.4) represent the fractions of chartists and fundamentalists in
the population, i.e. nc =
Nc
Nc+Nf
, nf =
Nf
Nc+Nf
, where Nc, Nf are the actual sizes
of chartist and fundamentalist population respectively. The moving average pM
is given by 1
M
∑M
k=1 p(t− k). Note also that the fundamentalist component has a
form very similar to that used in the Lux-Marchesi model ((2.2.2.1)). The prob-
abilities of switching between the two strategy types are also explicitly provided
and comprise two factors: the herding effect and the price-based information ef-
fect. The probability of switching from chartist to fundamentalist strategy, for
example, increases with the proportion of fundamentalists in the agent population
(herding) and with the absolute distance between the fundamental price and cur-
rent market price (price information). Similarly, the probability of switching of
fundamentalist to chartist strategy increases with the proportion of chartists as
well as the absolute distance between the current price and the moving average pM .
Once again, the model is quite capable of reproducing the stylised facts. In addi-
tion, the phenomenon of volatility bursts produced by the model can be traced to
an increase in the proportion of chartists in the population. This is a direct con-
sequence of the way in which strategy-switching probabilities are specified in the
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model - a large price deviation amplifies the chartist signal, which in turn attracts
more chartists, increasing the amplitude of price changes according to (2.2.2.4).
This process continues until the price is far enough from its fundamental value
to start attracting more fundamentalists. An additional interesting observation is
that the total number of agents N(= Nc + Nf ) matters - the stylised facts were
observed for N = 500, for example, but not for N = 50 or N = 5000. To try
to gain an understanding of whether this observation is significant, the authors of
Alfi et al. (2008) changed their model slightly by relaxing the requirement that
N be constant. In this second version of the model it was assumed that agents
enter the market when the observed historical volatility is sufficiently high, and
leave when it when it is sufficiently low. In this version of the model (and with
specific values of parameters that were used in the paper), N = 500 represents a
metastable state of the system - starting with a number of agents that is signif-
icantly different from 500 produces convergence to the state where it eventually
settles for oscillating around that number. There is therefore some evidence of
self-organising behaviour here.
2.2.3 Zero-Intelligence Model
A different approach to complexity in financial markets is exemplified in Smith
et al. (2003). Here, the emphasis is on the microstructure of the market. Most
financial markets operate through what is usually known as a continuous double
auction, where buy and sell orders come in from the outside and are matched
against each other in an appropriate fashion, producing trades. There are two
types of orders: market orders, and limit orders. Market orders are requests to
buy or sell a given quantity of the traded asset immediately, at the best available
price. Limit orders, on other hand, specify the worst price at which the order
should be executed (in addition to direction and quantity). Limit orders which are
not executed immediately and completely are stored in a queue, which is referred
to as the limit order book. Note that a market order cannot be executed unless
there is at least one stored limit order on the other side of the market, as there
would be no price to execute the market order at.
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This approach to price formation contrasts sharply with the models discussed
previously. There, the emphasis was on the strategies of the agents, so the price
formation algorithm was rather simple - the number of agents with a particu-
lar strategy determined the contribution of that strategy to the excess demand,
which, in turn, determined the price change in a simple (usually linear) fashion.
The model described in Smith et al. (2003), on the other hand is all about realistic
price formation. In fact, one of the goals of that model is to see whether we can
attribute any features of financial markets to the effects of microstructure alone.
To that end, the behaviour of agents in the model is very simple. In fact, strictly
speaking, there are no agents at all - all aspects of order formation, such as the
rate of arrival and cancellation of market and limit order, as well as their numerical
attributes, are assumed to be determined by model-specified stochastic processes
(with IID increments). This type of approach is also sometimes referred to as the
zero-intelligence agent model.
Since the model addresses market microstructure it is possible to assess its perfor-
mance by comparing its output to some real-world microstructure-related data. In
this respect, the so-called price impact function is quite important. This measures
the change in market price induced by a (hypothetical) market order of given size.
In other words given a limit order book, we can work out the price change ∆P
that will be induced by executing a market order of size Q. The resulting mapping
∆P (Q) is the price impact function. Clearly, the characteristics of this function
are important for the understanding of the variation in the magnitude of price
changes, as well as liquidity. Empirical evidence suggests that price impact is gen-
erally an increasing concave (mostly non-linear) function of the order size and this
is matched by the output of the zero-intelligence model. As far as the more tradi-
tional stylised facts are concerned, however, this model is not doing quite so well.
For instance, there is a mild (negative) autocorrelation in the size of price changes,
which takes some time to decay, contradicting SF3. The model also has difficulty
reproducing scaling (“fat tails”) in the distribution of price change magnitudes,
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which is in disagreement with empirically observed price change distributions.
Despite those shortcomings, one must not lose sight of the main result of the
model - the concavity and non-linearity of the price impact function. This is par-
ticularly important given the minimal assumptions the model makes about the
process of order origination. One could argue that the concavity of the impact
function is a fundamental fact, since it is a result of the way in which the market
is organised and has nothing to do with individual or aggregate agent behaviour.
Consequently, it is not abundantly clear that the choice of linear price impact
function, which was made in the strategic agent models previously discussed, is
always justified.
2.2.4 Chiarella-Iori-Perello model
It would seem that the microstructure of financial market does matter. At the
same time, it fails to explain many dynamical features that are usually associated
with the markets. It is interesting to consider the solutions to some of those failings
suggested in Smith et al. (2003). For instance, it is acknowledged that achieving
power law in the tails of the price change distribution will probably require some-
thing more involved than the IID (Poisson) order flows that are currently in the
model. The problem of autocorrelation in the size of price changes is also related
to the structure of the inputs: here it is suggested that the order flow should have
conditional, rather than unconditional structure. In other words, adding more
complexity to the process of order origination may help to reproduce some stylised
facts.
Now, we have already seem that the strategic agent models can replicate the
stylised facts as well as provide some insight into the mechanisms through which
they arise. The chartist-fundamentalist models, for example, link the phenomenon
of volatility clustering to an (self-reinforcing) increase in the proportion of chartists
in the agent population.
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It would therefore be interesting to see what happens if we “combine” the two
approaches, that is we have a model with decision-making agents and the market
microstructure. One such model is described in Chiarella et al. (2009). Here agents
must form an expectation of the return on the traded asset prior to submitting an
order. The expected return for agent i with time horizon τi is given by
rˆit,t+τi =
1
gi1 + g
i
2 + n
i
(
gi1
1
τf
ln
p
f
t
pt
+ gi2r¯
i
t + n
iǫt
)
(2.2.4.1)
The three summation terms in the brackets correspond to the contributions from
fundamentalist, chartist and noise trading strategies respectively, while gi1, g
i
2
and ni are the weights associated with those three strategies. The fundamen-
talist estimate of the expected return is based on log-ratio of the fundamental
price pft and current price pt, scaled by the fundamentalist time horizon τf (same
for all agents). The chartist estimate is based on the average of τi past returns
r¯it =
1
τi
∑τi
j=1 ln
pt−j
pt−j−1
. Finally, the noise component is given by a Gaussian random
variable ǫ ∼ N (0, σǫ).
Each agent is assumed to be equipped with an exponential (constant absolute risk
aversion) utility function U(W it ;α
i) = −e−αiW it , where W it is the wealth of agent i
at time t. Wealth is defined in terms of the cash position Cit and asset position S
i
t
as W it = S
i
tpt + C
i
t . Note that short positions are not allowed in this model. The
quantity of the asset that the agent wishes to hold at a given price p is then derived
from maximising the expected utility of future wealthWti+τ i = W
i
t+S
i
t (pt+τ i − p).
It is further assumed that the return ρt+τ i =
p
t+τi
−p
p
is distributed normally , that
is ρt,t+τ i ∼ N
(
rˆi
t,t+τ i , V
i
t
)
, where rˆi
t,t+τ i is defined in (2.2.4.1) and Vt is historical
variance of returns.
It turns out that maximising the expected utility under those assumptions leads
to the following expression for πi(p), the number of units of the asset an agent
wishes to hold at a given price level p:
πi(p) =
ln
pˆi
t,t+τi
p
αiV it p
(2.2.4.2)
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where pˆt,t+τ i = pte
rˆi
t,t+τi
τ i
is the future expected price. Since the model tries to
account for market microstructure, it needs to have a means to determine the type
and the parameters of the orders agents send to the market. To this end, one
could first note that there is a unique price p∗ at which the agent would be happy
with their current holding Sit , this is determined by solving (2.2.4.2) for p with
πi(p) = Sit . An agent would be willing to sell if p > p
∗ and buy if p < p∗. It is also
possible to determine a price range [pm, pM ] outside which the agent would not
trade. Here, the maximum price pM is equal to pˆ
i
t+τi
, since any price above that
level will lead to πi(p) < 0, violating the no-short-sell restriction. The minimum
pm is derived from cash constraints (the agent must always have enough cash to
purchase the desired amount of stock), and is given by the condition
pm
(
πi (pm)− Sit
)
= Cit (2.2.4.3)
The order formation then proceeds as follows: a price p is picked randomly in
the range [pm, pM ]. This price, together with (2.2.4.2), p
∗ and the market quote
{bqt , aqt} (best bid and ask respectively) determine the order parameters. There are
four possible cases:
1. p < p∗, p < aqt : submit a bid limit order for π
i(p)− Sit units at p
2. p < p∗, p ≥ aqt : submit a bid market order for πi(aqt )− Sit units
3. p > p∗, p > bqt : submit an ask limit order for S
i
t − πi(p) units at p
4. p > p∗, p ≤ bqt : submit an ask market order for Sit − πi(bqt ) units
Note that in the case of a market order, if the size of the best opposing limit order
is not sufficient to execute the market order fully, the quantity held by the agent
is adjusted for partial execution and the process is repeated (i.e. p is compared to
next best market price to form new order parameters). This stops when either the
agent’s desired πi is achieved through a series of market orders , or a limit order
is submitted.
Interestingly, simulations show that the model does not reproduce the stylised
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facts unless the chartist component of the strategy is “turned on” (that is gi2 >
0 ∀i). This agrees in general with the results of previously discussed chartist-
fundamentalist models where chartist influence was important for the formation
of certain dynamic market features (e.g. volatility clustering). The model also
provides some insight into the origin of large price moves: it appears that those
are primarily caused by large gaps occurring in the price levels adjacent to the
best bid or ask.
2.2.5 Additional Models of Agent-Based Markets
We have presented a few detailed examples of different approaches to modelling
complexity in financial markets. Of course, this particular research area is not
limited to the papers discussed so far. We will now conduct a brief overview of
other works in this field.
The model of Bak et al. (1997) may be regarded as a precursor of models with dif-
ferent type of agents (such as the chartist-fundamentalist models described above).
In this particular case there are two types of traders - noise traders and period-by-
period utility maximisers (fundamental value traders). In the very simple case of
a model with noise traders only the model could be described in terms of reaction-
diffusion process of interacting mass particles. This could then be used a basis
for studying more complicated model setups where agents imitate each others
behaviour and respond to recent market volatility. It should be noted that mech-
anism for order clearing was quite simple - the limit order book was not really
modelled.
The work of Maslov (2000) was likely the first to introduce an actual model of
limit order book with zero-intelligence agents. For the sake of simplicity it was as-
sumed that order cancellations were not permitted. Despite this very simple setup,
it was found that the model produced return time-series with statistical proper-
ties that were in qualitative agreement with those of real-world prices (including
long-range correlations and fat-tailed distributions of price changes). These results
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can viewed as providing evidence that at least some of the non-trivial behaviour
of price return time-series in financial markets is due to the structure of the limit
order book.
A simple model of limit order book with zero intelligence agents was presented
in Challet and Stinchcombe (2001). The limit order book was represented by a
discrete grid of prices, on which two types of particles randomly appeared (corre-
sponding to bid and ask orders). The authors were then able to draw analogies
with deposition-evaporation models of interacting particles in physics (with evap-
oration corresponding to order cancellation). Two particles of the opposing types
appearing on the same point of the grid were assumed to annihilate (corresponding
to orders fully matching in a limit order book). Here, again, power law in the tails
of the returns distribution, as well as volatility clustering were observed. Addi-
tionally, it was found that allowing order cancellation (evaporation) is important
if one is to obtain realistic behaviour of prices.
Slanina (2001) studied a mean-field approximation to the model of Maslov (2000).
A mean-field approximation is a modelling technique in physics where a many-body
system with complex interactions is approximated by replacing all interactions to
any one body with some average interaction. In this particular case, rather than
modelling the actual arrival of individual limit orders it was assumed that their
prices came from a uniform distribution and that the behaviour of both sides of
limit order book was symmetric. It then became possible to derive a closed-form
power-law expression for the distribution of price changes.
A somewhat different approach to modelling agent-based markets is introduced
in Foucault (1999). Here, the agents are no longer of the zero-intelligence type:
instead a game-theoretic approach to price formulation is used. This type of model
assumes that agents maximise some utility function based on a private valuation
of the asset being traded. While this approach is quite natural, it is not easy to
describe the resulting optimal behaviour of the agents in an analytically tractable
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manner - simplifying assumptions need to be made. In this particular case it was
assumed that the agents’ valuations were formed as a sum of a random walk pro-
cess representing the expected value of the asset payoff at some terminal time and
a trader-specific valuation component, represented by sequence of i.i.d Bernoulli
random variables. The agents then maximise a risk-neutral utility function based
on this valuation. A further simplifying assumption is that all limit orders sub-
mitted by agents expire after one time step. Using those assumptions, it became
possible to compute a subgame-perfect equilibrium to the trading game in the
model and obtain a set of testable predictions relating to the properties of the
limit order book.
Hollifield et al. (2004) extended the model of Foucault (1999) by allowing the
trader-specific part of the private valuation function to depend on the quantifiable
properties of the market that evolve with time. The particular properties cho-
sen for the model included the previous order quantities, the depth available at
bid/ask, the lagged volume of trading in the market, volatility and the present time
of the day. These assumptions produced a tractable model, however the authors
noted that some of the results obtained from it were inconsistent with empirical
observations - for instance the distribution of limit order price placement in the
model did not have tails that were as heavy as those observed in reality.
A different type of game-theoretic model of an agent-based market was presented
in Foucault et al. (2005). The authors assumed that the market is represented by
a discrete pricing grid, that buyers and sellers arrive to the market in an alternat-
ing fashion and that limit orders can only be placed within the current bid-ask
spread. The agents are then assumed to choose an optimum price for an order
by maximising a simple linear utility function that balances the desire to trade at
the best possible price with a lack of desire to wait for an order execution (the
waiting costs are agent-specific). The resulting optimal behaviour was then shown
to produce limit order books with at least some properties similar to those found
in real markets.
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Ros¸u (2009) proposed a game-theoretic model similar to that described by Fou-
cault et al. (2005), augmenting it by allowing traders to dynamically modify the
orders with cancellations. This assumption actually simplified the model, and,
together with some additional assumptions (such as finite capacity for the limit
order book) allowed the author to derive a tractable representation of the market
equilibrium in this model.
Cont et al. (2008) describe a model that, while bearing some similarities in ba-
sic setup to that of Foucault (1999) does not follow the game-theoretic approach.
The authors kept the basic premise of assuming the market to be represented by
a discrete pricing grid, but decided to model the state of the limit order book as a
Markov process whose state is completely described by the number of limit orders
available at each price on the grid on each side of the book. The transitions that
the state of this Markov process can undergo can only be due to the arrival of
a new limit or market order, or a limit order cancellation. The arrival of these
state-altering events were then modelled as various (mutually independent) Pois-
son processes, leading to a fully specified continuous-time Markov process. The
model can therefore be seen as yet another example of a zero-intelligence model of
the limit order book. According to the authors, that the model yields realistic fea-
tures for long-term average behaviour of the order book profile and price volatility.
An approach similar to that in Cont et al. (2008) was previously taken by Luckock
(2001). Here the assumption was that quantities available at the best bid/ask were
continuous time Markov processes, while the quantities of limit orders away from
best bid/ask were not. Results from Markovian queueing theory were then used
to derive quantities such as the expected number of orders at the best bid/ask,
the probability that the limit order book contained a certain number of orders
in equilibrium and the expected time to execution of an order at a given price.
The author then let the order book minimum tick size go to 0, deriving differen-
tial equations describing the limit order book in the limit of infinitely small tick
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size. This made it possible to arrive at some results relating to the stationary
distributions of bid and ask prices as well as to derive simple trading strategies.
Importantly all this was based on the assumption of an infinitely small tick size,
which is unlikely to be realistic.
Chan et al. (1999) provide an example of full model of a continuous double auction
market with heterogenous agents. All agents are assumed to be risk-neutral, with
the objective of maximising a utility function that depends on a payoff at some
terminal time. The agents differ in the method they use to arrive at their per-
sonal estimate of future price. There are three types of agents: Bayesian traders
form the base price by combining their private beliefs about the future payoff
with publicly available information via a Bayesian update mechanism, momentum
traders simply use the most recent return as an estimate for next period return,
and nearest-neighbour traders use a relatively sophisticated learning heuristic to
produce a price estimate. Note that the latter two types of the agent do not use
the future payoff information at all and can thus be regarded as two subtypes of a
“chartist” trader, while the Bayesian traders are obviously the “fundamentalist”
traders in this model. The authors did not compare the return time-series gen-
erated by their model with empirical studies, but did arrive at some interesting
conclusions regarding the relative dynamics of the populations of different types
of agents in the model. For instance, it was shown that while simple momentum
traders do poorly overall, nearest-neighbour traders do as well as Bayesian traders
in the long run and actually outperform Bayesians in the short run.
A very different approach to agent-based complexity is taken in Challet and Zhang
(1997). There the authors study an example of a very simple “pure” minority game,
the concept of which we have previously discussed in Section 2.2.1 (p. 21). Simply
put, a minority game is a many-agent game with several (usually two) possible
decisions, where those who pick a decision that turns out to be in the minority
invariably win. In the case of a binary decision minority game, there is a clear
analogy with financial markets, where the price goes up when the majority buys
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and goes down when the majority sells, but only whose who buy in the falling
market and sell in the rising one (i.e. only those in the minority) make a profit,
i.e. win. The authors of Challet and Zhang (1997) considered a model, in which
the agents can take one two (abstract) actions, and those in the minority win. The
agents make their decision by comparing past performance of their individual set
of strategies. The strategies map a finite length of the history of past outcomes
of the game to one of the two possible decisions (this is very similar to the model
developed in Johnson et al. (2003)). Despite the simplicity of the model, it was
found to display some interesting features - for instance, even though all agents
are completely self-interested the overall structure of decision-making appeared to
display a certain organisation and even co-operation.
Chapter 3
Description of the Proposed
Model
The agent-based models of the kind discussed in Chiarella et al. (2009), i.e. those
with strategic agents and market microstructure have some attractive features.
They reflect the process of order matching correctly, meaning that we do no need
to make assumptions about the functional form of the price impact functions.
They also have a potential to provide insight into the origin of various features of
financial market dynamics, since they look at the way in which decisions are made
on the level of individual agents.
Needless to say, this makes such models quite complex, and many modelling choices
must be made. The key challenge is to provide a decision-making mechanism that
is both realistic (i.e. takes account of the information available to the agent, as
well as their resource limitations) and at the same time not overly complex. Com-
plex decision-making mechanisms will lead to parameter bloat, which, in turn, will
make it difficult to trace the connection between the decision-making process and
the observed dynamic features of the model.
The Chiarella-Iori-Perello model presented at the end of previous section provides
a very reasonable model of a decision-making mechanism. But of course, other
36
3.1 General Formulation 37
approaches are also possible. In what follows we will present one such approach,
commenting on its distinguishing features and stating the research objectives one
might hope to accomplish using it.
3.1 General Formulation
We are going to construct an agent-based model of the markets, in which the
agents’ trading decisions are principally influenced by their personal beliefs about
future price moves as well as resources available to them. The main idea in our
approach will be simplicity - we shall attempt to find formulations for the various
components in an agent’s decision-making that are not needlessly complex. This
will not always be possible, of course, but it is important to keep that objective in
mind.
We will begin by assuming a population of agents of fixed finite size N . There
is a single type of asset in the market. This asset yields no income and has spot
delivery.
We further assume that the agents trade the asset by submitting limit and market
orders that are cleared through the standard continuous double auction mecha-
nism. These agent-based orders are the only source of orders in the markets, and
therefore the only source of trades, making the price generation process completely
endogenous. Note that short sales are allowed.
Since this is a dynamic model, a notion of time is also needed. In this case,
we shall assume a discrete time set T for the model, which we can take to be equal
to the set of natural numbers N without loss of generality. This time should be
thought of as event time, rather than physical time.
The basic outline of the market evolution through time under this model is as
follows: at every point in time t ∈ T (also called a “step” or a ”turn”) the agents
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will formulate their personal beliefs about the future direction of the asset price
moves. They will then submit limit and market orders in random order. Each
agent will get exactly one opportunity to submit an order at every time step t.
The orders thus submitted will generate trades. This process will be repeated for
all times t ≤ Tmax, where Tmax is a pre-determined maximum number of time steps.
The following sections will provide detailed description of the way in which various
aspects of this model operate.
3.1.1 Order Generation
Before we introduce the basic features of our model we shall consider the following
question: what is the simplest decision structure for a trader in financial markets?
Clearly, the fundamental decision for a trader is whether to buy or to sell, that
is to say, whether to submit a buy order or a sell order to the market. Since we
are specifically considering financial markets here, we can assume that the main
reason anyone would trade is for the purpose of capital gains, that is, to realise
a positive difference between the sale price and the purchase price. Intuitively, it
should always be the case that the agents that expect the asset price to go up will
want to buy, while those that expect it to fall will want to sell.
This can be formalised by saying that each agent forms a personal estimate pi
(i ∈ 1, . . . N) of the probability of the asset price going up (obviously 1−pi is then
the probability of the asset price going down). The agent would then be willing
to be long the asset if p >
1
2
and short if p <
1
2
. 1
The quantity pi, which we will often refer to as “personal belief”, therefore de-
termines the direction of the order an agent wishes to submit. We still need to
determine the other order parameters (quantity and price) and to this end we
introduce some further model concepts. First of all, similarly to the model in
1 if p =
1
2
the agent will not have a position in the asset
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Chiarella et al. (2009), we assume that each agent is initially endowed with a lim-
ited amount of cash, which we denote by Ci0. At any point in time t ∈ T the agent
will have some proportion of that initial cash amount invested in the asset. We
can therefore define the current investment proportion of the agent as:
ωit =
Qitmt
Qitmt + C
i
t
(3.1.1.1)
where Qit and C
i
t are asset and cash positions at time t respectively, and mt is the
mark-to-market price. Note that since short positions are allowed ω is a signed
quantity. Note also that the definition above applies for the short position as well
as the long.
Since the current investment proportion depends on the mark-to-market price,
we should take some care in defining it. In financial markets, it is standard prac-
tice to use either a last trade price or a best opposing order price (that is best bid
for short positions and best offer for long positions). Arguably, the best opposing
order price approach is more consistent, since it gives a better indication of the
price the which the position can be liquidated. However, since in our model there
is no liquidity provider (as the limit order book is generated endogenously by the
agents) the best opposing order price may be unavailable at times. Since we would,
in general, like to have a mark-to-market price, we will define m it as follows:
1. Best opposing limit order price, if it is available
2. Otherwise, best competing (i.e. same side of market) limit order price if it
is available
3. Otherwise, last trade price, if it is available
4. Otherwise, an initial price m0
The initial price m0 will be a model parameter. The actual value of m0 is not
very important, since we would mostly be concerned with analysing relative price
changes, but we do need to set this value in order to kick-start the market.
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Given ω, the agent’s current level of investment, it would make sense for an agent
to check whether this is level of investment is “right” given his or her current
beliefs about the future asset price moves. To this end, we introduce the desired
investment proportion ωˆit. This quantity should be related to the agent’s per-
sonal probability estimate pit - the more certain you are, the greater proportion
of your cash would you be willing to invest. More formally, we say that |ωˆit| is a
non-decreasing function of
∣∣∣∣pit − 12
∣∣∣∣. The simplest such function could be defined
as
ωˆit = 2
(
pit −
1
2
)
(3.1.1.2)
Given ω and ωˆ we can proceed to determine the desired order quantity ∆Q. To this
end, we note that following a trade of ∆Q units at price m the current investment
proportion ω will be given by
(Q+∆Q)m
(Q+∆Q)m+ (C −∆Qm) (3.1.1.3)
Note that the ∆Qm’s in the denominator cancel out. Setting (3.1.1.3) equal to
the desired investment proportion ωˆ and solving for ∆Q we get
∆Q =
[
ωˆ
C
m
− (1− ωˆ)Q
]
(3.1.1.4)
The square bracket operator [·] denotes taking the integer part and arises because
we do not allow for fractional unit asset holdings.
The algorithm described above captures the essence of the model - the trading
decision is based on the difference between the current and the desired investment
proportion, while the desired investment proportion is, in turn, determined by the
personal probability estimate. Of course, there are a number of additional fea-
tures that must be specified before a model is workable. Since we are explicitly
modelling the market microstructure we need a criterion to determine the type of
the order (market or limit). Now, market orders are qualitatively associated with
“impatience”. In our model, we will assume that impatience is in direct relation
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to the certainty the agents have of the future direction of prices - the further away
pi is from
1
2
the greater the impatience. Again, this can be specified quite simply
- given a number z ∈
(
0,
1
2
)
we will stipulate that if
∣∣∣∣pi − 12
∣∣∣∣ > z and if any
opposing limit orders are available the agent submits a market order, otherwise
they submit a limit order.
More precisely, in the case of a limit order, first a price l is determined, which
is better (from the order-placing agent’s point of view)2 than the best price on
the opposite side of the limit order book by the bid-ask spread factor φi, that is,
l = φib where b is the best opposing order price. The bid-ask spread fraction will
be given by
φi =

(1 + s
i)−1 for bids
1 + si for offers
(3.1.1.5)
where si is an agent-specific bid-ask spread value. The limit order quantity ∆Q is
then given by (3.1.1.4) with m = l.
Since we have stipulated that market orders are only generated when there are
limit orders on the side of the book opposing the market order direction, the mar-
ket order quantity will be given by (3.1.1.4) with m = b, the best opposing order
price. It is, of course, possible that the resulting order quantity exceeds the limit
order quantity available at price b, and so the order cannot be fully executed. In
this case the agent would trade as much as possible at b, then calculate the requi-
site order quantity based on the next best price and submit a new order, and so
on, until either the desired investment proportion is reached (that is ∆Q = 0) or
there are no more limit orders on the opposing side. In the latter case, since there
are no more opposing orders, the agent will switch to limit order placement.3
2 Here “better” means that if a bid order is being submitted, its price will be lower than the
best ask order price, while if an ask order is being submitted, its price will be higher than the
best bid.
3 Note that strictly speaking, this is not a market order (that is, an order which specifies only
the quantity to be transacted and not the price), but rather a crossing limit order. However, the
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There is a small but important issue that needs to be resolved before we can
consider the order-generating mechanism as being completely specified: that of
initial determination of the desired direction of order. A close inspection of
Equation 3.1.1.4 (p. 40) reveals that the value (and therefore the sign) of ∆Q
depends on m, the mark-to-market price, but according to a definition given ear-
lier the mark-to-market price itself depends on the direction of the trade. This
circularity can easily be resolved if one observes from Equation 3.1.1.4 (p. 40) that
∆Q is a monotonically decreasing function of m. Thus if we denote by b the best
bid price and by a the best ask price, and assume that a ≥ b it is obvious that
∆Q(a) ≤ ∆Q(b). Therefore, as far as trade direction determination is concerned,
there are only three possibilities:
1. 0 < ∆Q(a) ≤ ∆Q(b) Agents wishes to buy and is able to buy at a, the best
ask price
2. 0 > ∆Q(b) ≥ ∆Q(a) Agents wishes to sell and is able to sell at b, the best
bid price
3. ∆Q(a) ≤ 0 ≤ ∆Q(b) Two sub-cases are possible:
 Both ∆Q(a) and ∆Q(b) are zero, in which case there will be no order
submitted
 At least one of ∆Q(a) and ∆Q(b) is not zero in which case the agent
is willing to buy at the best bid, sell at the best ask or both. This,
however, is not possible since the agent is a price-taker, not a price-
maker.
Thus, no order is possible in this case
From this, it can be seen that an algorithm for determining the initial direction of
the trade can be specified as follows:
1. If ∆Q(a) > 0 the order is a bid
effect of a crossing limit order is the same as that of the market order.
3.1 General Formulation 43
2. If ∆Q(b) < 0 the order is an ask
3. Otherwise no order will be generated
Having specified the trading mechanism, it is worth taking some time to reflect
on the possible value of ω (given by (3.1.1.1)) that this mechanism produces. In
particular, we would like to ensure that the current investment proportion does,
in fact, always remain a (signed) proportion, that is, ω ∈ [−1, 1] at all times. This
is relatively easy to check in the case of long position (Q > 0) in the asset - the
trading mechanism ensures that the agents will never buy more units of the asset
than they can afford, in other words that C will always be greater than or equal to
0. Note also that the limit order price is always formed as some non-zero multiple
of a reference market price, and thus all prices produced by this model are strictly
positive. Combined with our initial assumption of a strictly positive initial cash
account allocation this means that the denominator Qm + C is always strictly
positive and greater than or equal to the numerator Qm. Therefore it is always
true that ω ∈ (0, 1] for Q > 0.
The situation is slightly more complicated for short positions in the asset (Q < 0).
There is no issue with the cash account C in this case, since short sales can only
increase the value of that account, so C > 0 at all times for a short asset position.
Now, we would like the current investment proportion value for the short position
to lie in [−1, 0). This means that the following inequalities must be simultaneously
satisfied: 

Qm
Qm+C
< 0
Qm
Qm+C
≥ −1
(3.1.1.6)
leading to 
Qm+ C > 0C ≥ −2Qm (3.1.1.7)
The trading mechanism described so far makes no automatic provision for these
two conditions to hold, so we should view them as additional constraints to be
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enforced for every agent.
It is important to realise that conditions (3.1.1.7) are in no way artificial ad-
hoc constraints that we impose simply to restrict the value of short position ω to
[−1, 0). Recall that the quantity Qm + C is the current liquidation value of an
agent’s portfolio, so the condition Qm+ C > 0 is equivalent to requiring that the
agents remain liquid at all times.
The second condition requires a little more explanation. To understand we must
take a close look at what is actually involved in carrying out a short sale. Strictly
speaking, in order to sell an asset short, an agent must first borrow this asset some-
where. In reality this is done via the means of a separate market of sale-repurchase
(“repo”) transactions. We are not going to have a full model of this market, and
will simply assume that an agent may always borrow stock from a generic stock
lender whenever required. But even with this simplified model, it is important
we realise that an agent cannot simply borrow as much stock as he likes - this
would then be asymmetric to the long case in which the buying power is naturally
restricted by the cash available. The symmetry is restored by a requirement that
any stock borrowing transaction by the agent must be accompanied by an act of
putting up a cash collateral that is transferred to the stock lender in exchange for
the stock. The value of this collateral is equal to the current market value of the
number of units of the asset being borrowed. Of course, the value of the collat-
eral is immediately recovered by the agent since he sells the asset in the market.
Should the asset price go up (that should the situation become less favourable for
the short-seller) further payments (“margin calls”) would be required by the stock
lender. The cash value of margin calls is always such that the total cash collateral
held by the stock lender against an agent is equal to the absolute value of this
agent’s short position at the current market price.
Of course, the cash collateral will be refunded to the agent, once the borrowed
stock is bought back from the market and returned to the stock lender, so the
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liquidation value of agent’s portfolio is, indeed, always given by Qm + C as long
as the agent is capable of buying the stock back from the market. This last qualifi-
cation is crucial - the agent will only get the cash collateral back only if he is able
to buy the asset from the market with the cash that is actually available. It would
make sense, then, to keep track of the cash actually available to the agent (that
is amount of cash the agent has once the collateral payments are taken account
of), but luckily this is not required. We have already established that the total
value of the cash collateral held against an agent is equal to the absolute value of
the agent’s current position, i.e. −Qm. The amount of cash actually available is
therefore given by C − (−Qm) = Qm + C. In other words, with the simplified
repo market assumptions outlined above, the amount of actually available cash is
numerically equal to the agent’s portfolio liquidation value. The requirement that
an agent always be able to close out his short position using only only the cash
that is actually available, is then equivalent to the condition Qm + C ≥ −Qm,
which is gives the second condition in (3.1.1.7)
3.1.2 Belief Formation
We now turn to the belief formation mechanism. Clearly, this model would have
little in the way of dynamic behaviour if the personal estimates pi never changed.
It would be natural to suggest that beliefs change in response to new information
becoming available. We can envisage two broad types of information that is avail-
able to the agents - exogenous information and endogenous (market-generated)
information. The proposed approaches to modelling both information types will
now be described
Exogenous Information
In modelling terms, we will postulate that market-exogenous information is mani-
fested as a number in [0, 1], with values in [0, 1
2
) corresponding to “bad” news (for
the traded asset) and values in (1
2
, 1] corresponding to ”good” news.
Incoming exogenous information can be further subdivided into two generic types:
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public and private information. We can think of public information as being gener-
ally available for all agents, while private information is agent-specific. Note that
private information should not be interpreted as some kind of insider knowledge,
(and therefore always beneficial for the agent); rather private information in this
model subsumes all non-public influences on the agent’s decision-making. Exam-
ples of such influences could include having access to exclusive research, consulting
other parties or even a trader’s “gut feeling”. Modelling such influences individu-
ally and in full generality is an extremely ambitious task, so instead we chose to
collect these agent-specific effects under the general auspices of private information.
Thus, denoting the public information process by ξˆ and the i-th agent private
information process by ξi, we represent information in the model a vector of N +1
stochastic processes each taking values in [0, 1]. For simplicity we will assume that
all information processes are independent.
Given a public information value ξˆt and private information value ξ
i
t, the agent
will combine the two values and use the result to update the personal belief value
pi. The most natural way to combine public and private information, is to use a
linear combination of the two, i.e. we have that the combined signal χit is given by
χit = w
iξˆt + (1− wi)ξit (3.1.2.1)
where wi is an agent-specific public information weighting. Note that it is possible
that one of the information signals is not available (usually public information),
in which case the combined signal value is simply set to the available information
value.
As soon as the combined value of χt is produced, an agent updates their per-
sonal belief estimate based on this value via a belief update mapping β(·), that is
pit = β(χt, p
i
t−1).
Of course, to have a working model we need to specify the actual functional form
for this belief update system. There is more than one way to do that, but, it would
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be sensible to stipulate that β(·) does not produce personal belief values that are
inconsistent with the direction of the change of information. In other words we
would require that the signs of pit − pit−1 and χt − pit−1 are the same for all i. This
means that we assume that no agent is sufficiently irrational to mistake “good”
news for ”bad” news and vice versa.
Arguably, it would be somewhat unrealistic to have a belief update function that
always sets the new personal belief value to be the same as the combined informa-
tion value χt. Instead, it might be desirable to allow for some “inertia” of personal
opinion. With that in mind, a relatively simple way to update an agent’s belief
would be for pt to be generated by a random variate Bt from a probability dis-
tribution that depends on χt and pt−1. One possibility would be for the updated
belief to be uniformly distributed on the interval between the previous belief and
the current information release, that is
Bt ∼ U (min (χt, pt−1) ,max (χt, pt−1)) (3.1.2.2)
This specification is in line with the general requirement that direction of the
update is consistent with new information arrival, and has the additional benefit of
being non-parametric, avoiding the need for yet another agent-specific parameter.
Endogenous Information
The algorithm outlined in the previous section is designed to update agents’ per-
sonal beliefs in accordance with some (generic or specific) information sources.
However, it would usually be the case that some trading activity take place be-
tween the arrival of information and an agent placing an order. One can argue that
there should be a mechanism that allows an agent to adjust their personal belief
based on the price moves that took place since that belief was formed. Specifically,
we can envisage two types of belief-adjusting behaviour:
 Mean-Reverting - an observation of moves that confirm the agent’s initial
belief will reduce the strength of that belief and vise versa
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 Trend-Following - an observation of moves that confirm the agent’s initial
belief will increase the strength of that belief and vice versa
For brevity we will often refer to agents with mean-reverting type of belief-adjusting
behaviour as “MR agents” and to those with trend-following type as “TF agents”.
Note that it is also possible for an agent not to have any belief-adjusting behaviour,
in which case the agent belief dynamics will be solely described by algorithms spec-
ified in 3.1.2 (p. 45). The agents of this latter type will be referred to as “NA
agents”.
Now, it would make sense for the degree to which the belief is increased or reduced
to be proportional to the size of the price move that triggered the adjustment. We
would therefore need some means of determining whether a price move is “large”
or “small”. A very natural way to achieve this is to specify a probability distribu-
tion of relative price changes. The probability of obtaining the price move of the
observed size, or a more extreme one, would then serve as a good indication of the
significance of that move.
We would like to avoid specifying an actual theoretical distribution of price changes
for each agent as that would likely require parametrisation and would be difficult
to justify. Instead, we chose to use the empirical distribution of observed price
ratios for this purpose. More specifically, we assume that every time a trade occurs
an agent would make a record of the ratio of the prices of the current trade and
the trade immediately preceding it. We denote by R+(n) the set of last n positive
recorded changes (i.e. ratios of successive trade prices) and by R−(n) the set of
last n negative recorded changes. We further denote the empirical distribution
functions of R+(n) and R−(n) by FR+(n)(·) and FR−(n)(·) respectively. Given the
magnitude of the most recent price change rt, we define by ζ(rt) the empirical
probability of observing a move of the magnitude that is at least as extreme as rt,
conditional on it being in same direction as rt, i.e.
ζ(rt) = P (r ≥ rt | rt > 1)1rt>1 + P (r ≤ rt | rt < 1)1rt<1
=
(
1− FR+(n) (rt)
)
1rt>1 + FR−(n) (rt)1rt<1
(3.1.2.3)
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where r denotes the random variable modelling the price change magnitude. Note
that by construction ζ(rt) will be close to 0 for “small” price changes and close to
1 for “large” price changes.
Before we specify the exact formula for endogenous belief adjustment, we will
briefly discuss the properties we would like this adjustment to possess. First we
need some definitions. Given a price change rt and a personal belief pt we say that
the price change is
 co-directional (to the belief) when rt > 1 and pt >
1
2
, or when rt < 1 and
pt <
1
2
 contra-directional (to the belief) when rt > 1 and pt <
1
2
, or when rt < 1
and pt >
1
2
We further define by X(pt) the extreme end of the unit interval nearest pt, i.e.
X(pt) = 1pt> 12
(3.1.2.4)
We would expect that, depending on the type of adjusting behaviour the adjust-
ment would work as follows:
 Mean-Reverting: co-directional price changes should reduce the strength
of an agent’s belief (move it closer to 1
2
), while contra-directional price
changes should increase it (move it closer to X(pt)
 Trend-Following: co-directional price changes should increase the strength
of an agent’s belief (move it closer to X(pt)), while contra-directional price
changes should reduce it (move it closer to 1
2
)
Given the above, we propose that value ∆p of belief adjustment due to endogenous
information should be given by
∆p = (1− ζ (rt)) (K − pt)u (3.1.2.5)
where u ∼ Uniform(0, 1) and K is given by Table 3.1 (p. 50)
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MR TF
Co-directional 1
2
X(pt)
Contra-directional X(pt)
1
2
Table 3.1: Determining the value of K
3.1.3 Overall Model Structure
We have previously given a brief description of the way in which the market in
this model evolves through time. A more detailed description can now be provided.
At time t = 0 an initial population of agents must be constructed. Each of N
agents must have the following attributes specified:
 Initial personal belief value pi0 ∈ [0, 1]
 Initial cash allocation Ci0 ∈ [0,+∞) (the initial position Qi0 is set to 0 for all
agents)
 The private information generating process ξi(t)
 The random variable si that will generate the bid-ask spread fraction
 Whether the agent endogenous information belief adjustment type is:
– Mean-Reverting (MR)
– Trend-Following (TF)
– None (NA)
 Maximum memory length Rmax ∈ [2,+∞] (only needed for MR and TF
agents)
 Minimum memory significance threshold Rmin ∈ [0, Rmax − 2] (only needed
for MR and TF agents)
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In addition to the initial agent population the following must also be specified at
time 0
 The public information process (common to all agents) ξˆ(t)
 Market parameters, namely the initial reference price m0 and the minimum
price tick size ǫ
After the time 0 specifications are complete the model proceeds to evolve through
time steps t ∈ [1, Tmax]. At the beginning of every time step public and private
information processes determine if their respective values should be generated at
this time. For every agent i, as long as at least one of ξˆt and ξ
i
t has been generated
this turn, the personal belief pit is updated according to 3.1.2 (p. 45)
The agents are then given exactly one opportunity to place a order in the market.
The sequence in which they do so is random. If the agent is of either the MR
or the TF type, they adjust their personal belief to take account of the market
endogenous information (i.e. taking into account any trades that took place since
their current belief value was formed at the beginning of the turn) according to
3.1.2 (p. 47). Based on the combination of personal belief value, the current po-
sition and the resources available the currently active agent then decides whether
an order should be placed, and if it is, what the parameters of the order should
be. The order generation is described in detail in Section 3.1.1 (p. 38).
After an order is placed in this way it is cleared in the market to determine if
a trade is generated. Any trades that do occur are reported to the both the agents
whose orders were matched to produce the trade so that their positions and cash
accounts can be updated accordingly.
After every agent in the population has had an opportunity to place an order
as described above, the turn ends. The process is repeated until the maximum
number of time steps Tmax has been reached.
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For ease of reference, the basic steps of the above algorithm are also summarised
in Figure 3.1 (p. 53).
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Figure 3.1: Basic Structure of Model Algorithm
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3.2 Model Discussion
3.2.1 Modelling Human Behaviour
Modelling the behaviour of agents in the market is a cornerstone of our model.
Generally speaking, representing human behaviour in algorithmic form is no easy
task. It is understandable therefore, why some authors (see e.g. Smith et al.
(2003)) choose to forego agent behaviour modelling altogether (particularly since
they seem to be able to get very good results even with “zero-intelligence” agents).
But this approach is still unsatisfactory in some respects, since we might like to
have a more detailed model of where the orders in the market come from.
As we chose to have intelligent agents in our market, there were some modelling
decisions that needed to be made. Broadly speaking, we required the agents to be
able to do the following:
 Form their estimates of the probability of the asset price moving in one
direction or the other
 Transform their beliefs into actions in the market (i.e. order submission),
given their resource constraints
In terms of behavioural psychology, the two tasks above represent judgement and
choice respectively.
When trying to come up with a mathematical model of human behaviour it is
quite common to use some form of Bayesian update mechanism for judgement
tasks, while choice-related tasks are usually handled via expected utility theory
(see Chiarella et al. (2009) for an example). Both approaches however, also have
their critics - see Shafir and Leboeuf (2002) for an overview of the state of be-
havioural modelling theory.
Since we have decided to use neither Bayesian updating for judgement, nor ex-
pected utility for choice, it would be worthwhile spending some time exploring the
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rationale for those decisions.
Modelling Judgement
Recall that our judgement model is primarily built around updating an agent’s
personal belief value pit, given a belief update mapping β(·) that also takes the
combined exogenous information signal χt as an argument. An arguably natural
way to specify β(·) is via a Bayesian update mechanism, i.e.
pt = P (↑ |χt) = P (χt | ↑)P (↑)
P (χt | ↑)P (↑) + P (χt | ↓)P (↓) =
P (χt | ↑) pt−1
P (χt | ↑) pt−1 + P (χt | ↓) (1− pt−1)(3.2.1.1)
Note, however, that this particular form of belief update mechanism requires a
specification of the likelihood functions P (χt | ↑) and P (χt | ↓) for each agent.
But that is not really the biggest problem with the Bayesian approach. There
is some empirical evidence that whenever people need to make decisions about
updating some kind of probability based on newly available information, Bayesian
prescriptions are not being followed (see Appendix Section A.1 (p. 153) for con-
crete examples)
Now, while the preceding considerations provide some grounds that would jus-
tify not using Bayesian update algorithm for judgement modelling, we still need
to specify what is it that we should use instead. Providing a belief update model
that takes account of all possible human biases is likely an impossible task. An al-
ternative would be to apply the principle of maximum possible simplicity that was
alluded to in our model introduction section. Now, we might reasonably expect
the belief updating algorithm to have the following properties:
 The personal belief value after an information signal has been processed
should be closer to the value of that signal than prior to information pro-
cessing
 We may wish to avoid pure deterministic update algorithms, as they would
not adequately reflect the volatility of human nature.
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In our view the algorithm described by (3.1.2.2) is one of the simplest ways of spec-
ifying an update mechanism with the properties above, which is why we decided
to stick with using it, rather than something more complicated.
Modelling Choice
In mathematical economics it is commonly accepted that choice should be mod-
elled via recourse to an expected utility framework.
An example of application of expected utility theory to agent-based market models
is given by Chiarella et al. (2009). There the agent’s desired portfolio composi-
tion (number of units of the traded asset held) is determined by maximising the
expected value of the agent’s utility function of wealth, given the current price
level. Note that additional distributional assumptions needed to be made for this
approach to work (namely that the agent’s expected returns are Normally dis-
tributed). This is a feature of the expected utility framework - as we are trying
to find the expected value of a function that maps states of the world to some
real values, we do need to specify the probability distribution associated with the
possible states of the world.
We could adopt a similar approach for this model, but there is some experimental
evidence that puts the use of expected utility for modelling choice in some doubt.
Some examples of such evidence can be found in Appendix Section A.2 (p. 156)
Again, although it is possible to make a case against the use of expected util-
ity, rejecting it does require us to come up with an alternative. In a manner
similar to the discussion in 3.2.1 (p. 55) we are going to argue that coming up
with a replacement for expected utility that would account for all quirks or hu-
man decision-making and be robust is nigh on impossible. Instead it might be a
good idea to come up with a decision-making algorithm that is sufficiently sophis-
ticated to provide a variety of order-generating outcomes we need for the market
to function, but is not overly complex. The simplicity of such an algorithm would
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be its main virtue. In contrast, not only does the use of expected utility appear
to be unjustified in some situations, but it also require additional distributional
assumptions to be made, making it, in our view, a less preferable option.
This drive for simplicity resulted in the adoption of decision-making algorithm
described in Section 3.1.1 (p. 38) for our model. The simplicity partly comes from
the fact that the agent’s personal belief estimate pi reflects both the belief about
the future price moves (and therefore the desired position in the asset) and the
certainty with which this belief is held (the further away the value of pi is from 1
2
the more certain the belief). Clearly the more certain an agent is of their belief,
the greater proportion of the available resources would he wish to be placed at risk
in exchange for possible future gains. This leads quite naturally to the concept
of the investment proportion - the ratio of the risky part of portfolio to the total
portfolio value. It becomes clear at this point that the decision-making dynam-
ics in this model should be driven by the mismatch between the risk implied by
the current investment proportion and the desired level of risk, expressed by the
degree of certainty with which an agent holds their personal belief. The simplest
way to map the personal belief to a desired level of risk is to map pi, which is a
number in [0, 1] to a number in [−1, 1], making it directly comparable with the
current investment proportion. If we choose this mapping to be linear (and there
is no reason to believe that it should not be linear), we arrive at the concept of
the desired investment proportion (3.1.1.2).
This is essentially the core of our decision-making mechanism, the rest is details.
We believe that it would be difficult to come up with a simpler algorithm in the
circumstances, which is why we chose to go along with it.
3.2.2 Time Considerations
We have previously stated that one of the goals an agent-based market model
might try to achieve is the replication of at least some of the statistical properties
of the log-returns of real-world asset prices. Exactly what properties are to be
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looked at is a question we shall answer in Section 3.3 (p. 69), but for now, we
will need to address the issue of how we are going to compare our results to those
obtained empirically. Specifically, the issue is as follows: the log-returns in real life
are obtained from a sequence of successive pries taken at regular time intervals.
Thus, for instance Lux (2001) uses minute-by-minute data from the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange. 4 While our model will obviously generate trades, nothing has
been said about the way in which we model the physical time that elapses between
trades (or, indeed, between any other events that occur as the model evolves).
We therefore need to elaborate on the issue of time in our model. It has al-
ready been mentioned that we have a time set T whose elements correspond to
“steps” in the evolution of the model. It is also possible to talk about ”trading
time”, that is a sequence of times τj , j ∈ {1, . . . , Nτ} at which trades occur.
We are going to argue that, as far as the physical time model is concerned, the
most sensible thing to do in the circumstances is to assume that the trades are
equally spaced in physical time. We can provide some justification for this choice
by first looking at the possible ways of specifying a physical time model in our
setting. As has already been pointed out, the temporal progression of our market
model is essentially event-based. Physical time does not arise naturally from any
of the assumptions and stipulations we have made so far. Consequently, a physical
time model can only be specified on top of the existing model, as an additional
element of what we already have. Of course, all we need to specify is the set of
probability distributions for physical time intervals that elapse between the various
events the model generates. However, any such specification would be ad hoc at
the moment, since there does not appear to be an easy way to specify the param-
eters of physical time generator distributions that would be based on the model
parameters specified so far. Even if we take the relatively standard approach of
4It is theoretically possible to obtain trade-by-trade data, but this is typically quite expensive
to procure, which is why empirical studies tend to employ data collected at regular time intervals.
A notable exception is Zhou (1996) which uses tick-by-tick data
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assuming that all physical time intervals can be modelled as exponential random
variables, we would still need to specify one distribution parameter for each type
of physical time interval (inter-order, inter-turn etc). Naturally, all of this can be
done, but the number of parameters in our model will inevitably increase as a re-
sult. Assuming equal intervals of physical time between consecutive trades allows
us to avoid undue parameter bloat. It should be made clear that we are harbouring
no illusions with respect to the realism inherent in this assumption - it is clearly
unrealistic. However, specifying a more elaborate (and inescapably parametric)
model of physical time does not appear to fully justified from the point of view of
the overall model tractability.
Admittedly, simply stating that all inter-trade intervals are equal is not quite
enough. Strictly speaking we still need to specify the actual length of the intervals
as well. However, this turns out to be less of a problem than one would expect.
Recall that in real markets important distribution properties of log-returns exhibit
scaling, For instance, according to Gabaix et al. (2003), the value of the estimated
exponent of the power law in the tail of the log-return distributions was found to
be close to 3 across many assets. This finding did not depend on the chosen time
scale for log-return aggregation. This suggests that at least some of the properties
of the log-return distribution do not depend on the frequency of observation. We
can therefore cautiously propose that even if we do not specify the actual length
of the time intervals we are using, our results should be broadly comparable to
those derived from observations equally spaced in physical time (such as those in
Lux (2001), for example).
Of course, we must realise the fragility of this approach - it is not possible to
establish that such “scaling” properties of the log-returns are universally valid.
Indeed, Zhou (1996) provides evidence that at least for some properties related
to autocorrelations of log-returns the frequency of aggregation does matter. We
should therefore avoid making overly general conclusions based on our results
matching (or not matching) the values of various empirically estimated quantities
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derived in real market studies. But, even with the very simple physical time model
outline in this section, we should, nevertheless, expect a degree of broad similarity
between our simulated results and empirical findings.
3.2.3 Methodological Considerations
The inherent complexity of agent-based models means that simulation is almost
certain to be a significant tool in their understanding. Of course, as a method of
scientific investigation, simulation does have a number of drawbacks. A simulation
cannot really be used to support a statement of the form “for all” - only to disprove
it by generating a counterexample. Any link between the inputs and outputs of a
model that were established with the help of simulation can only be of a statistical
nature, and we can therefore be never properly certain that those links are not
accidental. Even establishing those links can be difficult if a simulation has a large
number of parameters.
It is not surprising therefore that many of the models previously discussed at-
tempt to apply some kind of theoretical analysis, which is then compared against
simulation results. However, it is also true that the analytical approach is facil-
itated by certain simplifying assumptions the models make. For example, in the
chartist-fundamentalist model of Alfi et al. (2008), the link between the model
parameters and the evolution of asset price is given explicitly by (2.2.2.4). Since
the market dynamics in this case depend in particular on the numbers of agents
in the two categories (chartist and fundamentalist), and the probabilities of tran-
sitions between the categories are also explicitly given, it is possible to work out
the long-term distribution of Nf and Nc. This makes it possible to predict that
the model will be mostly in the state dominated by fundamentalists, with an oc-
casional transition to a chartist-dominated state. It is then hypothesised that this
latter state should produce volatility bursts, and this is subsequently confirmed
by the simulations. In other words this analytical prediction has been made possi-
ble by the simplifying assumptions that provided explicit mechanisms for linking
numbers of agents in each category to excess demand, and then for linking excess
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demand to price dynamics - the microstructure was ignored.
The zero-intelligence model of Smith et al. (2003), on the other hand, does not
ignore the microstructure - on the contrary it is all about the microstructure.
However, in this case, the simplification comes in the form of assuming that all pa-
rameters of incoming orders are generated in a pre-specified random manner. This
simplification allows to make some predictions - for example that the concavity
of the price impact function will depend on the so-called granularity parameter ǫ
(which can be thought of as a typical order size, adjusted for the order arrival and
cancellation rates). More specifically it was predicted that the concavity would
increase as granularity decreases (in particular the price impact function will be
almost linear for large values of ǫ), which was later confirmed by the simulations.
This is not to say that there is anything wrong with the simplifying approach
to agent-based modelling - it is important to have simple models which are at
least partly analytically predictable, as they can serve as a basis for the more com-
plicated models. But if we do consider a model which combines strategic agent
decision-making with market microstructure, and which also enhances agent het-
erogeneity (by introducing individual wealth levels, for example), we should not
necessarily expect the analytical predictions to be as forthcoming as they are in
the simpler models. The main reason for that is that, roughly speaking, model
complexity does not always increase gradually. Thus, there is no way to “partially
reduce” the complexity of a market microstructure model - one needs both the
limit order book and the market orders for such a model to work at all - and this
means providing a mechanism for the generation of order parameters. If, in ad-
dition, one introduces intelligent agents as the source of orders, those agents will
need to be heterogeneous in some sense - a microstructure model which does not
produce orders of varying sizes and price levels will not be very interesting.
But the complexity does not stop there. All agents must effectively be tracked
on an individual basis, as there is a constant bi-directional interaction between the
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agent population and the market microstructure. Each trade affects the portfolio
compositions of the two agents involved, and the portfolio compositions will in turn
determine the parameters of the orders (if any) submitted by those agents at the
next opportunity. Moreover, the microstructure itself also affects the parameters
of the orders submitted. In other words, once one decides to pursue a model with
market microstructure where orders originate from heterogeneous agents, one will
find that there is a certain minimal level of complexity in interactions that cannot
be reduced without compromising the entire approach.
All this does not necessarily mean that no analytical treatment is possible. The
model in Chiarella et al. (2009), for example, uses simulation only, but this is not
a proof that no other approaches are viable. The main argument is not that the
models of this kind are too complicated for analytical treatment - this cannot be
established at this point. Rather, we would like to argue that the complexity of the
models means that even just studying them through simulation is a significant un-
dertaking in itself. Since we have made a concious choice to relax the assumptions
that facilitate analytical tractability in other models, it would perhaps be wise to
accumulate some statistical description of the system dynamics before attempting
to explain any features we discover theoretically. We would therefore like to use
simulation as the primary tool of study of our model for now.
3.2.4 Notes on Model Implementation
Here, we will briefly discuss the implementation of our model. We will concentrate
on the general computational, rather than language specific aspects, providing an
overall idea of memory requirements, computational performance and how well the
model scales as its size increases.
Computational Aspects
In our model there are three principal components, whose interaction produces all
of the dynamical behaviour we are interested in:
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 Public information generator
 Population of agents (including agent-specific private information genera-
tors)
 Limit order book
The first of those essentially is a function that generates a single number in [0, 1]
once per time step, and should not cause any computational difficulties.
The agent population is not very difficult to implement either. There are no
complex computations that need to be performed by the agents, so we are unlikely
to face any computational bottlenecks from anything that happens on the agent
side. As far as memory requirements are concerned, those can be determined by
looking into the (largest possible) set of attributes an agent can have. Those are
 id number (integer)
 personal belief value (float)
 cash position C (float)
 asset position Q (integer)
 maximum memory length (integer)
 minimum significant memory length (integer)
 weight of private belief (float)
 bid/ask spread generator (unknown - composite type)
 private information generator (unknown - composite type)
 prices of previous trades (number of trades stored × float)
Note that the size of the two generator attributes is unknown, however, these can
be estimated by remembering those would typically be require to generate a ran-
dom variable on a bounded interval. Assuming for the moment that an average
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probability distribution on a bounded interval can be described by two parameters,
we can say that the size of each of the two generator attributes is approximately
that of two floating point numbers. Thus, for a population of N agents, each of
whom stores no more than M trades in memory, we have an approximate mem-
ory requirement of N (4si + (7 +M) sf ), where si and sf are integer and floating
point value sizes respectively. For a typical population of 100 agents on a 64-bit
Linux machine (which where our implementation of a model resides) with a mem-
ory length of 100, this gives 100 (4× 4 + 107× 4) = 44400B, which is just over 43
KB. Of course, this is a rough estimate that will vary depending on the size of
the agent population as well as maximum memory length. This estimate will also
increase if a decision is made to use double precision floats and/or long integers,
or if more than one thread of execution is used, but it worth noting that even if
this memory requirement goes up by 2 orders of magnitude (to approximately 4
MB) this is still very small compared to RAM available on most modern machines
(which is normally counted in gigabytes).
We now turn to the limit order book. Again no difficult calculations are required
here. For the sake of efficiency, it would make sense to store bid and ask orders in
two separate ordered set containers (with different ordering criteria), so that the
best bid and ask are always the first elements in the corresponding sets. Obviously,
each incoming limit order will need to be inserted in the corresponding ordered set
(assuming it was not fully cleared), but in a well implemented ordered set the cost
of such insertion is proportional to log n, where n is the size of the relevant size of
the limit order book, which should not cause any computational difficulties. We
can also calculate the memory requirements by going through the same exercise
we did for the agent population. The attributes of a limit order 5 are:
 id number (integer)
 order size (integer)
5The market orders are always, by definition, transient, so their storage requirements can be
safely ignored.
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 order price (float)
 order originator (pointer or integer)
 order creation time (integer)
Note that we do need to store some kind of a reference to the agent that created
the order, since this agent would need to get notified when an order is transacted
upon. This can either be an integer (corresponding to the agent’s id number) or
(depending on the language of implementation) a pointer to the object represent-
ing the agent. On most systems the size of the pointer is the same as that of an
integer number, so there really is no difference between the two for our purposes.
The order time is needed to ensure a unique ordering within the corresponding part
of the limit order book - limit orders with the same price are cleared on the FIFO
(first-in-first-out) basis. Thus, the approximate memory requirement for the limit
order book with bid depth Nb and ask depth Na is given by (Na +Nb) (4si + sf ).
From simulations we know that a typical value for the depth of a side of the limit
order book is around 50. We can therefore compute a typical memory requirement
on a 64-bit Linux machine at 100 ∗ (4× 4 + 4) = 2000B, i.e. less than 2 KB. This
is very small and hardly something to worry about.
In our analysis so far we have not encountered any issues that could stand out
as potential causes for a computational bottleneck. However, there is one fur-
ther aspect of the model implementation that needs to be considered - storing the
results of the simulation. We have not defined the precise goals of our research
programme yet (this will be done in Section 3.3 (p. 69)), but whatever the actual
goals may be it is clear that we need to store at the very least the information on
trades occurring, as well as the state of the limit order book. If we want to inves-
tigate properties of the agent population, we also need to store the corresponding
agent information. In fact, for this implementation of the model, we have decided
to store the following data
 Agent population data - at the beginning of every simulation run and at the
end of each time step
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 Limit order book data (entire book of orders) - at the end of each time step
 Trade data - each time a trade occurs
 Order data - each time an order is created or cancelled
 Public information value data - at the beginning of each time step
Now, this is quite a lot of data, so we must be careful in how we approach the
task of storing it. File input/output is typically a relatively slow operation in
any application (since it requires accessing the computer’s hard drive rather than
operational memory) and ours is no exception. We have therefore decided to use
the following steps in our implementation to try to minimise the impact of file
output on the run times:
 The implementation will be multi-threaded, with each thread executing a
single simulation run at a time
 Each simulation run will output its data to one of 6 run-specific data files:
– an agent data file
– a limit order book data file
– a trade data file
– a created order data file
– a cancelled order data file
– a public information value data file
 The file descriptor for each run-specific data file will opened once at the
beginning of each simulation run and closed at its end
Note that although this setup will, in general, involve several threads writing to
the hard drive at the same time, they will be writing to different files, so there will
be no two threads trying to access the same filesystem resource simultaneously.
However, one must remember that all operating systems have an upper limit on the
number of file descriptors that could be open at the same time. Should the number
3.2 Model Discussion 67
of concurrent threads of execution ever exceed this limit, our application can run
into considerable problems. We should therefore make an effort to ensure this does
not happen (even though, in practice, on the particular system were were running
this implementation, we were never even close to reaching this file descriptor limit).
We have decided that the run-specific data files will be plain text files storing
the corresponding data in a comma-separated (CSV) format, with columns corre-
sponding to different data fields, and rows corresponding to different records. So
for example, a limit order book data file will have data fields corresponding to
the simulation id, run id, time step number, bid/ask flag, unsigned order quantity,
order price, limit order depth, and the owner agent id, with each row will repre-
senting a single limit order. We chose CSV format due to its wide popularity -
virtually all third-party software for data analysis is capable of reading CSV files.
As one might expect, the resulting set of data is quite large - a typical simulation
with 100 agents, 1000 time steps, repeated 100 times (i.e. with a 100 simulation
runs), will produce data files totalling just under 7 GB in size.
We can therefore conclude that while our implementation does not have a large op-
erational memory footprint, it does use a considerable amount of file input/output
(which is normally quite CPU-intensive) and requires quite a lot of disk space.
Run Times and Scaling
We will now conduct a brief investigation of how the runtimes of our implemen-
tation depend on the scale of system we are trying to simulate. In particular, we
will look at how the performance is affected when we change
1. the number of simulation runs
2. the number of time steps in a simulation run
3. the number of agents in the population
The results of this investigation are presented in Figure 3.2 (p. 68). We can
observe that while none of the three graphs presented exhibit an exactly linear
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dependence on model scale, the dependence of model runtime on the number of
agents is clearly very super-linear. This is an interesting observation, indicating
that the complexity of the model increases in a non-trivial way as the number
of market participants increases. This also implies that one must be cautious in
increasing the number of agents - it is best to do this in small increments, lest the
system run out of resources unexpectedly.
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3.3 Research Goals
Any agent-based model of a financial market should be able to reproduce at least
some stylised facts, and ours is no exception. In particular, we would need to be
able to reproduce the “macro” stylised facts outlined in section Section 2.2 (p. 19)
(leptokurtosis in the distribution of returns, autocorrelation in absolute values of
returns, etc.). But since our model also includes the market microstructure, we
should be interested in the “micro” stylised facts (e.g. reproducing the concave
shape of the price impact function) as well. It is worth stressing once again that
conformance of the dynamics of the model to the stylised facts cannot be consid-
ered a “proof” of the model - after all it could simply be coincidental, dependent
on the particular values of parameters we chose, etc. Nevertheless we can say with
high degree of confidence that a model that does not reproduce the stylised facts
would have very little value.
We will now provide a detailed description of the various types of statistics that
we would like to compute for each set of simulation results. These can be divided
into two broad groups: statistics describing the distribution of the log-ratios of
successive trade prices (i.e. trade-by-trade log-returns) and those that describe
the shape of the limit order book.
3.3.1 Distribution of Log-Returns
We are aiming to replicate at least some of the statistical properties of the distribu-
tion of log-returns observed in real financial markets. We can start by checking the
overall shape of the distribution: we expect the density function of the log-returns
to be unimodal and display some leptokurtosis. To check this we first compute
the empirical distribution function F¯Xˆ(x) of the sample of simulated log-returns
Xˆ. Recall that an empirical distribution function F¯ (x) of sample simply counts
the number of elements in the sample that not strictly greater than x. Note that
the empirical distribution function defined in this way is, in fact, a maximum like-
lihood estimate of the true distribution function.
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Once we have obtained the empirical distribution function, we can numerically
differentiate it (using a three-point finite difference scheme), to obtain an estimate
of the empirical density function, which we can then plot to gain some insight into
the shape of the distribution. We should mention here that the above procedure
is not the usual approach to estimating a sample-based density function - more
sophisticated methods are usually employed for this purpose, such as, for example,
the kernel density estimator. However, since all we really need here is an idea of
the general shape of the distribution of log-returns, the simple method we have
outlined above will suffice.
We can also use the empirical distribution function to obtain a rough idea of
the thickness of the tails of the log-return distribution by plotting its quantile val-
ues against corresponding quantiles of the standard Normal distribution, i.e. via
the means of normal Q-Q plot. Plotting the quantiles of any Normal distribution
against those from standard Normal generates linear Q-Q plots, consequently non-
linearity in the shape of the normal Q-Q plot can be used to judge the degree of
departure from Normality in the empirical distribution plotted.
The above is designed to provide us with an initial idea of the distribution shape.
We do still need a concrete numerical way to measure how “fat” the distribution
tails are. This can be tested by calculating the sample kurtosis of our generated
log-return distribution and comparing it to empirical observations (such as those
in Lux (2001)). Another way to analyse the tail behaviour of log-returns is via the
Hill index Chiarella et al. (2009), Lux (2001). This is given by
βˆH (n, k) =
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
ln xn−i+1 − lnxn−k
)−1
(3.3.1.1)
where xi are the ordered elements of a log-return sample, and k is some index
that denotes the “tail” cut-off point. The justification for using this index lies
in extreme value theory: if the maximum (minimum) of a distribution follows a
generalised extreme value distribution then the upper (lower) tail of the distri-
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bution is close to that of a generalised Pareto. More specifically, if we assume
that the sample under consideration comes from a “heavy-tailed” non-Gaussian
distribution, the values in the tail of the distribution should have have Pareto law
with some exponent β and minimum value equal to that of the tail cut-off point.
6 The value βˆH in (3.3.1.1) is then simply a maximum likelihood estimator for
the shape parameter β of this Pareto distribution. Various studies (see e.g. Lux
(2001), Gabaix et al. (2003)) indicate that in real financial markets the value of
this index lies between 2.5 and 3.5, with an average value close to 3.
It must be pointed out that there is no easy way to select the “correct” tail cutoff
point. Discussion in Chiarella et al. (2009) suggests that 5% of data should be se-
lected, while Lux (2001) lists several of the more sophisticated algorithms (mostly
based on minimising the subsample estimator error). None of the candidate meth-
ods for choosing the tail sample size however seem to have clear advantages. We
would therefore propose that for our investigation, Hill index values should be
estimated for a range of sample sizes (from 1% to 10% of the total sample).
Note that empirical log-return distributions are not only leptokurtic, but also
usually positively skewed, that is there is more mass in the left tail then there is in
the right. We can check that our generated distribution also has this property by
calculating the sample skewness parameter, as well as comparing the Hill indices
of the two tails.
In addition to heavy tails of the observed distribution real-world log-returns also
appear to exhibit non-stationary behaviour (“memory”), apparent in the phe-
nomenon of volatility clustering. One way to study memory properties of the
log-return is via their autocorrelation function, commonly abbreviated as ACF.
6Note that since Pareto law is only defined for positive quantities, we must transform the
log-return sample (by taking the negative of the values in it) when dealing with the left tail of
the log-returns distribution
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Recall that sample autocorrelation function is given by
C(k) =
1
n
∑n
i=k+1 (xi − x¯n) (xi−k − x¯n)
1
n
∑n
i=1 (xi − x¯n)2
(3.3.1.2)
where x¯n is the sample mean. Empirical studies indicate that the autocorrelation
of log-returns declines quickly (as function of lag k), while the decline of the auto-
correlation of absolute (or squared) returns is relatively slow. This slower decline
of absolute return autocorrelation corresponds to volatility clustering.
We can also study the long-term memory property of volatility via the means
of the modified R/S statistic, given by
Qn =
1√
Vˆn (q)
(
max
1≤k≤n
k∑
i=1
(yi − yˆn)− min
1≤k≤n
k∑
i=1
(yi − yˆn)
)
(3.3.1.3)
with yi = |xi|. Vˆn(q) is given by
Vˆn(q) = Vˆn + 2
q∑
j=1
ωj(q)γˆj,n (3.3.1.4)
where Vˆn is sample variance, γˆj,n is sample auto-covariance with lag j and
ωj(q) = 1− j
q + 1
q < n (3.3.1.5)
The R/S (“rescaled range”) statistic is the range of partial sums of deviations of a
time series from its mean, rescaled by its standard deviation. It was first proposed
by Hurst (1951) and subsequently popularised by Mandelbrot (see e.g. Mandelbrot
(1972)) who argued that the R/S statistic is a more robust method of estimating
long-range dependence in time series, as compared to standard correlation-based
estimates. The statistic was further modified by Lo (1991) to remove effects of
short-term dependence up to lag q, leading to the expression in (3.3.1.3). Note
that setting q = 0 recovers the original unmodified R/S statistic.
We can determine if there is persistent behaviour (memory) in the sample up
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to time n by checking whether the βn =
lnQn
lnn
is different from 1
2
, with βn >
1
2
corresponding to positive long-range dependence, and βn <
1
2
indicating negative
long-range dependence. Note that we need to determine what we consider to be
“short-term” memory, that is choose a value of q. Following Chiarella et al. (2009)
we set this value to 20.
3.3.2 Limit Order Book Shape
We also need to establish whether there is any correspondence between the prop-
erties of the simulated and real-world limit order books.
We will start by looking at the price impact function. Recall that a (virtual)
price impact function φ(q) of limit order book is defined as the potential change in
the logarithm of price level due to an effective market order of size q. According
to Smith et al. (2003) in reality this function is concave in order size. We can
test this by sampling the bid and ask limit order books at various times within
our simulation. For each such sampled limit order book we can easily determine
the empirical price impact data and then try to fit a curve of the form aqb to the
data, where a ∈ R, b > 0 are some coefficients. Concavity of the function would
therefore be given by the value of b, with b < 1 indicating a concave price impact
function. Since in general we would have one value of b for every limit order book
sampled, we would need to average over all samples (within the same simulation
run) to determine a representative value.
In addition, following Chiarella et al. (2009), we propose to study the distribu-
tion of the limit order price placement distances from best competing price. In
other words, given a limit order price p, we compute the distance δ(p) between
this price and the best competing limit order price (best bid for bid orders and
best ask for ask orders). More specifically we define
δ(p) =

p− p
∗
a for ask orders
p∗b − p for bid orders
(3.3.2.1)
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where p∗a and p
∗
b are the best ask and bid order prices respectively. Note that it
possible for δ(p) to be negative (indicating a limit order that was placed inside
the bid-ask spread). Empirical studies (Zovko and Farmer (2002), Potters and
Bouchaud (2003)) indicate that if the sample of distances δ(p) is restricted to
positive values only, the right tail of their distribution is described consistently
by a Pareto law with exponent ranging from around 1.5 to 1.7. We can therefore
apply the Hill index estimator (3.3.1.1) to the positive subset of the δ distances
obtained in the course of our simulation to check this particular distributional
property.
3.3.3 Miscellaneous Analysis
In addition to trying to reproduce various properties of real financial markets we
might like to perform some further analysis of the model results - all agent-based
models presented so far attempted to provide some additional insight into the ori-
gins of market dynamics.
As previously discussed (see Chapter 1 (p. 13)) large market moves are of particu-
lar interest in this respect, since they appear to a recurring feature of the market,
and have far-reaching consequences. Now, we should be careful to avoid promising
to turn lead to gold - we would not be able to “predict” large market moves in any
sense. After all, the model under consideration is driven primarily by various types
of information - in other words a collection of exogenously specified processes. We
can, however, attempt to determine the conditions under which such price moves
occur with an increased frequency.
As we also keep track of each agent’s individual wealth, we can potentially look at
ways in which trading redistributes wealth. This is hardly an unimportant matter
- many large insurance companies and pension funds are significant players in the
stock markets. The wealth of those institutions is (should be) of great concern to
a significant number of people, so establishing the ways in which this wealth can
vary as a result of trading could be quite important. To this end it might be useful
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to fit a Pareto distribution to the sample of final (time T ) agent wealth. Note that
he term “wealth” here refers to total wealth, i.e. the total portfolio value Qm+C
of each agent. We are particularly interested in the estimated value of the Pareto
shape coefficient α since that measures the inequity of the wealth distribution (the
smaller the value of α the greater the inequity). It is also quite easy to estimate
the minimum value parameter xm of the Pareto distribution, as well as the shape
parameter estimation error ǫ(αˆ) - see Appendix B (p. 163) for the details of esti-
mation procedure, as well as discussion of using the Pareto distribution to model
wealth.
Chapter 4
Simulation Results
In this section we will present the results of simulated evolution of our model
through time under varying input parameters. Although we strived to avoid in-
troducing too many model parameters, we still do need to set quite a few before a
simulation can be launched. The most logical way proceed in this situation is to
establish a benchmark set of simulation parameters and then try to vary the value
of one parameter at a time and observe the effects. We should also keep in mind
the fact that we are trying to compare the statistical properties of our artificial
market to those of real-life financial markets. Therefore, finding combinations of
input model parameters that produce markets which have statistical properties
close to those in reality can be viewed as a calibration procedure.
We will investigate each combination of input parameters by evolving the mar-
ket over 1000 time steps (i.e. Tmax = 1000), repeated 100 times. Each of those
100 runs will start with exactly the same set of parameters (including individual
agent parameters). We will also keep the initial reference price m0 = 100 and use
the minimum tick size of 0.01 throughout.
Once all simulation runs are complete, we will analyse each of the generated runs
in turn to extract the following information:
1. The empirical distribution function of the log-return distribution (leading to
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the density estimate and the Normal Q-Q plot), as well Hill indices of both
right and left tails of that distribution
2. Autocorrelation function properties, specifically:
(a) The autocorrelation function of log-returns
(b) The autocorrelation function of absolute log-returns
(c) The difference between the two
3. The behaviour of the modified R/S statistic for varying lengths of the time
window concerned.
4. Standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of log-returns
5. The shape (concavity parameter estimate) of the price impact function
6. The density function estimate and the Hill index of the distribution of (pos-
itive) limit order placement distances from best (δ) for bid and ask sides of
the market
7. The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of Pareto law that we
will attempt to fit to the final (time T ) agent wealth distribution for each
run.
Each of these quantities will be calculated on a run-by-run basis, i.e. there will be
a Hill index estimate for each separate realisation of the simulation. This means
that for each simulation we will have a set of as many estimates of each kind
as there are runs in the simulation (100 in our case) We can then compute the
mean and standard deviation of the estimated quantities across runs. Note that
for vector-valued estimated quantities (such as Hill index ranges, autocorrelation
functions and empirical distribution functions) means and standard deviations will
be calculated on a point-by-point basis. In the case of the autocorrelation function,
for example, we will compute the mean and standard deviation of the autocorre-
lation values at the first lag, at the second lag and so on. The same principle will
be extended to other vector-valued estimates.
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The rest of this section will be dedicated to analysing the results of running the
simulation of our model market under various combinations of input parameters.
The description of the various cases to be considered and the corresponding sim-
ulation results will be covered by Section 4.1 (p. 78) - Section 4.8 (p. 92). Note
that because of the large amount of illustrative material that is needed to represent
various aspects of the simulated results we have decided to provide a separate sec-
tion (Section 4.11 (p. 100)) for graphs and tables describing those results. Finally
Section 4.12 (p. 146) contains the discussion of the results obtained
4.1 Reference Case
4.1.1 Setup
For the initial stages of our investigation, we will need to establish a set of input
parameters that we can use as a reference when we begin varying the parameters.
Although this reference case can be quite arbitrary it would make sense to try to
choose the parameters that make it “simple”, so that more complex combinations
of parameters can be added later.
With this in mind, we decided to set up a reference case as follows:
 100 agents with the following parameters:
1. No endogenous information adjustment (the agents are of the “NA”
type)
2. Initial personal beliefs generated by a uniform random variable, p0 ∼
U(0, 1)
3. Initial cash accounts generated by a Pareto random variable, C0 ∼
Pareto(10000, 1.4)
4. The bid-ask spread fraction will be generated by a uniform random
variable st ∼ U(0.001, 0.01)
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5. The public information weight w will be set to 1 - we will ignore exoge-
nous private information for this case
 The public information process ξˆt will generate a value from a standard
uniform distribution at the beginning of every time step, ξˆt ∼ U(0, 1)∀t ∈
[1, Tmax]
The choice of the Pareto distribution to generate initial wealth may not seem
obvious at first, however, as it happens, wealth is usually modelled as being
Pareto-distributed. Pareto distribution is used to model strictly positive con-
tinuous quantities (of which wealth or income would be an obvious example) and
has two parameters: the minimum attainable value xm and the shape coefficient
α. In terms of wealth distribution, α measures the degree of wealth inequity - the
larger its value the more equitable the wealth distribution is. The United Nations
global household wealth distribution study (Davies et al. (2006)) reports a range
of possible values for α, with the most equitable value being approximately 1.4.
We have decided to start with this, since a more equitable wealth distribution is
less likely to introduce extreme effects in simulation results. Appendix B (p. 163)
has more details on the use of Pareto distribution for wealth modelling and the
global wealth study cited above.
We should be precise with regards to what we mean when we say that initial
values for agent beliefs and cash accounts are generated by some distribution: the
values are only being generated once per simulation. In other words, the starting
values of beliefs and cash accounts are the same for each of the 100 simulation runs.
This is a general principle that will apply to all cases that will be investigated.
4.1.2 Results
We can see straight away that the distribution of log-returns of successive trades
generated by this simulation is going to be fat-tailed - the shape of the estimated
density function of log-returns in Figure 4.2a (p. 101) exhibits a high degree of
leptokurtosis (long tails and very sharp “peak”). Fat tails are also apparent in the
4.1 Reference Case 80
Q-Q plot Figure 4.2b (p. 101), which shows a highly non-linear dependence of the
quantile values of the empirical log-return distribution on those of the standard
Normal. Further, both left and right tails of the log-return distribution Figure 4.2c
(p. 101) - Figure 4.2d (p. 101) have Hill indices below 2.5, going as low as 1.2
for the higher quantiles. The sample kurtosis estimate in Table 4.1 (p. 110) also
points to very fat tails, although we should point out that the standard error of the
kurtosis estimate has the same magnitude as the actual mean estimate, suggesting
that we should treat estimated kurtosis values with caution. Table 4.1 (p. 110)
also shows that the sample skewness is not very significant. This should not be
surprising, as we have effectively defined our model to be symmetric in terms of
buying and selling by the agents. We should therefore not expect the estimated
skewness to be significantly different from 0 in any of our simulations.
A look at the autocorrelation structure reveals a few interesting things. First
of all, Figure 4.11a (p. 115) shows that the autocorrelation of returns dips below 0
for the first few lag values, before stabilising at what is effectively zero. The second
observation is that the autocorrelation of absolute returns decays slower than that
of actual returns (see Figure 4.11c (p. 115)). This implies that there is a degree
of volatility clustering present in the simulated results. While this is encouraging,
as we are looking to reproduce the phenomenon of volatility clustering, it must be
noted that
1. This difference of decays only lasts for a few trades, whereas results in Lux
(2001) suggest that it should persist for longer period of time.
2. The difference goes negative after some time before reverting to zero even-
tually. Since autocorrelation of returns is effectively 0 by that time, this
dip below zero is due to autocorrelation of absolute returns actually going
negative (this can also be confirmed by looking at Figure 4.11b (p. 115) )
We can also see that the modified R/S statistic stays above 1
2
even for very large
time lags, implying a presence of long-term memory in the absolute returns. Again,
while this is good news, it must be pointed out that the amount by which the value
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of the statistic exceeds 1
2
is quite small for most lags.
Turning to the statistical properties of the limit order book, we can see from Ta-
ble 4.10 (p. 124) that the price impact function is actually concave in hypothetical
order size, although we cannot claim that the degree of concavity is strong - the
estimated concavity parameter indicates a power function with exponent ≈ 0.8.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the virtual price impact function is not linear in order
size, which is consistent with empirical findings.
As far as other limit order book properties are concerned, we can see from Figure 4.20a
(p. 129) and Figure 4.20b (p. 129) that the distribution of δ does not have the
long power-law tail empirical research suggests it should have. In fact the distri-
bution appears to be almost uniform. In retrospect, this should not be surprising.
For the reference simulation, we chose to explicitly specify that the bid-ask spread
s be generated by a uniform random variable taking values in [0.001, 0.01]. This
does not directly translate into a uniform range of limit order prices, since those
are generated by multiplying a reference price by a function of s (see (3.1.1.5)).
However, given the range of values s takes in this case, we could expect the differ-
ence between the limit order price and the current best competing price to have a
rather thin-tailed distribution.
Finally, from Table 4.19 (p. 138) we can see that the estimate of the Pareto
shape parameter is around 1.2 for the final agent wealth distribution, which is
lower than the shape parameter value of the initial agent wealth distribution of
1.4, suggesting greater average inequity in wealth at the end of the simulation.
4.2 Varying Agent Numbers
4.2.1 Setup
In this investigation, we will take the reference case from Section 4.1 (p. 78) and
see what would happen if we vary the number of agents in the market, keeping
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all other parameters unchanged. Specifically we will simulate with the number of
agents N being equal to 50, 200 and 500 and compare them against the N = 100
reference case.
4.2.2 Results
The plots of the values of the Hill index (Figure 4.3c (p. 102) - Figure 4.3d (p.
102)) show that the tail thickness (as measured by the Hill index) seems to gen-
erally increase with the number of agents. If we turn to Table 4.2 (p. 110) to see
whether this behaviour is confirmed by sample log-return moments, we will see an
interesting pattern emerging. It appears that the standard deviation of log-returns
decreases as the number of agents increases, while the kurtosis actually increases
at the same time. This indicates that increasing the number of agents does tend to
produce more frequent extreme price moves. This result may be considered some-
what surprising, as we might expect that increasing the number of agents would
mitigate extreme price moves via some form of averaging effect - clearly this is not
the case here.
The autocorrelations of log-returns appear to be unaffected by changing the num-
ber of agents (see Figure 4.12a (p. 116)), however there is a pronounced effect
in autocorrelations of absolute log-returns (Figure 4.12b (p. 116)). It appears
that increasing the number of agents leads to the ACF of absolute returns decay-
ing slower, leading to larger differences between it and the ACF of actual return
(Figure 4.12c (p. 116)). We can also see that the absolute return ACF (and there-
fore the ACF gap) does not dip below 0 for N = 200, N = 500 as much as it does
for the lower agent numbers. In fact for N = 500 there seems to be no dip at all.
While the ACF behaviour is probably closer to what we would expect in the
real markets for the N = 500 case, we also observe an extremely high kurtosis
and extremely low Hill index value for this particular number of agents. Although
we do want “fat tail” these values suggest an incidence of extreme moves that far
exceeds that usually observed in the markets.
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Note that the long-term memory effect, as measured by R/S statistic is also more
pronounced for greater number of agents, particularly for the case N = 500 (see
Figure 4.12d (p. 116)) As far as the shape of the price impact function is con-
cerned, we can see from Table 4.11 (p. 124) that the price impact is concave in
order size in all cases considered here, although there is evidence that the degree of
concavity decreases with the number of agents. It is also clear from looking at the
graphs of ask and bid δ density functions in Figure 4.21a (p. 130) and Figure 4.21b
(p. 130) that we still do not have anything resembling a power law behaviour in
their tail. This should not be surprising as we are still assuming that the spread
generating random variable is uniform in [0.001, 0.01].
Finally, from Table 4.20 (p. 138) we can see that, broadly speaking, increas-
ing the number of agents tends to decrease the equity in the final agent wealth
distribution.
4.3 Varying The Public Information Generator
Specification
4.3.1 Setup
In this investigation, we once again take the reference case in Section 4.1 (p. 78)
and vary the type of the exogenous public information generator ξˆ(t). Specifically,
in addition to our reference case ξˆt ∼ Uniform(0, 1)∀t ∈ [1, . . . , Tmax] we will
consider the following cases:
1. ξˆt ∼ Beta(0.5, 0.5) ∀t ∈ [1, . . . , Tmax]
2. ξˆt ∼ Beta(1.5, 1.5) ∀t ∈ [1, . . . , Tmax]
3. ξˆt ∼ Beta(2.5, 2.5) ∀t ∈ [1, . . . , Tmax]
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Figure 4.1: Density Functions for the Symmetric Beta Distribution with Different
Shape Parameters
where Beta(α, β) is the standard two-parameter Beta distribution on [0, 1]. 1 Note
that we do note have any reason to suppose that any of our information generators
should be asymmetric about 1
2
, which means that our choice of Beta distributions
will be limited to those for which the two shape parameters are equal (α = β). We
will therefore use a single parameter to distinguish the Beta distributions in what
follows.
Figure 4.1 (p. 84) shows the density functions for the four information genera-
tor distributions considered.
1The uniform distribution is also a member of the Beta distribution family, with α = β = 1
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We will have public information values generated on every turn in all cases. All
other parameters remain unchanged, in particular we are still ignoring the private
information here.
4.3.2 Results
Interestingly, the types of information generator we have chosen for this particu-
lar investigation seem to matter little when it comes to the estimated Hill index
values (Figure 4.4 (p. 103)). Of course, there is a difference in the index values
plots, but it appears to be neither consistent, nor particularly significant. The
sample kurtosis observations in Table 4.3 (p. 111) are slightly more telling. In fact
we can conjecture that the greater the theoretical standard deviation of the Beta
public information generators, the greater the sample kurtosis of the log-returns
generated.
As far as autocorrelations are concerned, Figure 4.13a (p. 117) shows that choice
of public information generator type does not really affect ACF of log-returns.
The ACF of absolute log-returns (Figure 4.13b (p. 117)) is not much different -
although there is some difference in the initial decay rates between the different
generator types, the overall shape of the autocorrelation function is more or less
the same for all of them.
We can also see from Table 4.12 (p. 125) and Figure 4.22 (p. 131) that vary-
ing public information generator type has little effect on either the shape of the
price impact function or the distribution of δ
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4.4 Varying the Inequity of the Initial AgentWealth
Distribution
4.4.1 Setup
Here, we will consider what happens when we change the distribution from which
the initial agent cash positions are generated. Specifically, we will vary the degree
of inequity in the starting wealth distribution (described by the Pareto distribution
shape parameter α, see Appendix B (p. 163) for details). Thus, in addition to
the reference case for which the α parameter value for set to 1.4 we will consider
two additional cases: α = 1.0 and α = 2.0. Recall that the smaller the value of α,
the more inequitable the initial distribution. In other words, the two additional
cases we are considering correspond to an initial wealth distribution that is more
inequitable than that in the reference case (for α = 1.0) and less inequitable (for
α = 2.0).
Note that we keep the minimum attainable value parameter xm at 10, 000 for
all three distributions.
4.4.2 Results
From Figure 4.5 (p. 104), Table 4.4 (p. 111) and Figure 4.14 (p. 118) we can see
that no aspect of the generated log-return distribution appears to be influenced
by the choice of the shape parameter of the initial wealth distribution. Similarly,
there is no evidence in Figure 4.26 (p. 135) of the limit order placement being
influenced by the value of α. There is some suggestion in Table 4.13 (p. 125) that
the concavity of the price impact function is influenced by α, as the estimated value
of concavity parameter is closer to 1 for the more equitable distribution (α = 2.0),
but this difference is not very big.
Finally, the estimated terminal wealth distribution parameters in Table 4.22 (p.
139) show that the inequity in the terminal wealth distribution tends to increase
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in comparison to that in the initial distribution, except for the case α = 1 where
it stays approximately the same.
It should not be a complete surprise that the initial wealth distribution matters
so little - after all by changing it we are affecting an initial, that is non-persistent,
simulation parameter. It may be difficult to expect a parameter of that type to
have a profound influence over the entire period of the market evolution in time.
One thing we can take away from this analysis, is that there does not appear to be
any evidence to suggest that trading in the market reduces inequity in the wealth
distribution.
4.5 Investigating The Effects of Uniform Initial
Wealth Distribution
4.5.1 Setup
Although we have previously varied the value of the α parameter of the initial
agent wealth distribution (Section 4.4 (p. 86)), we have not changed the type of
this distribution. So far, initial wealth generation was the only part of our model
that did not use uniform random variables. With that in mind, one might rea-
sonably enquire whether the power law behaviour we have been observing in the
tails of our log-return distribution is not , at least in part, due to the power law
we have pre-specified for the initial wealth of the agents.
We will therefore now consider two further initial setups: one with initial agent
wealth coming from a uniform distribution on [104, 6 × 104] and one with initial
agent wealth generated by a uniform distribution on [104, 2× 105]. Note that we
have kept the minimum initial agent wealth at the same level it is in the reference
case (104). In addition the first uniform distribution had its maximum value pa-
rameter chosen to result in the same expectation as the wealth distribution in the
reference case.
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4.5.2 Results
From the normal QQ plot in Figure 4.6b (p. 105) we can immediately see that
replacing the power law in the initial agent wealth distribution with a uniform law
does not have any significant effect on the tails of the log-return distribution. Al-
though Hill index plots Figure 4.6c (p. 105) - Figure 4.6d (p. 105) reveal that for
both uniform wealth distribution cases the index values are somewhat higher than
they are in the reference case (implying slightly “thinner” tails), this difference is
very small. The log-return distribution sample moments in Table 4.5 (p. 112) do
not show a great deal of variability either.
We can also see from Figure 4.15 (p. 119) that changing the type of the initial
agent distribution seems to affect neither the autocorrelation of the log-returns
nor the modified R/S statistic behaviour.
As far as limit order book properties are concerned, we can observe that while
uniform wealth distributions appear to produce virtual price impact functions
that are less concave than those in the reference case (Table 4.14 (p. 126), the
distributions of bid/ask placement from best is not affected by the type of initial
wealth distribution (Figure 4.24 (p. 133))
Overall we can conclude that using uniform distribution to generate initial agent
wealth does not produce results that are significantly different form those obtained
a power-law (Pareto) initial wealth distribution.
4.6 Varying Bid-Ask Spread Generator Type
4.6.1 Setup
Here, we are going to try varying the distribution of the random variable that
the agents use to generate the bid-ask spread s every time they place a limit
order. Recall that for the reference case this distribution is taken to be uniform in
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[0.001, 0.01]. This specification was rather arbitrary, so it would be interesting to
see what effect different choices of the spread generator will have. We will therefore
consider the following specifications for s
1. s ∼ U ([0.001, 0.01]) (the reference case)
2. s ∼ U ([0.001, 0.05])
3. s ∼ U ([0.001, 0.1])
4. s ∼ Exp ( 1
0.0055
)
In other words we would first like to see what would happen if we vary the default
spread generator by having it take value in a larger region. In addition, we would
like to see what happens if we do not assign an upper limit to the possible values
of s. This may be a good idea, since we have so far failed to replicate the power
law in the tail of limit order price placement distance δ and it is not certain that
this can be achieved with spread generator that has an upper bound. To this end,
we deiced to try generating the spread by an exponentially distributed random
variable. The parameter of the distribution was set to 1
0.0055
to match the expec-
tation of the uniform spread generator in the reference case.
All other parameters are unchanged from those described in Section 4.1 (p. 78)
4.6.2 Results
We can see that while the Hill index estimates for the three uniform spread gen-
erators have more or less the same behaviour, the Hill index for the exponential
generator implies a relatively higher incidence of large price moves (Figure 4.7c
(p. 106) - Figure 4.7d (p. 106)). The sample log-return moment estimates in
Table 4.6 (p. 112) show that both sample standard deviation and sample kurtosis
increase for the uniform spread generators as we increase their corresponding up-
per bounds. We can also see that standard deviation and kurtosis are higher for
the exponentially generated spread, then they are for the uniform spread with the
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same mean.
The log-return autocorrelation plots (Figure 4.16a (p. 120), Figure 4.16b (p. 120),
Figure 4.16c (p. 120)) reveal no real difference in autocorrelation structure under
the four kinds of spread generators present. Interestingly, the R/S statistic plot
in Figure 4.16d (p. 120) suggests that the exponentially generated spreads leads
to less pronounced long-term memory effects than those coming from the uniform
generators.
The most interesting statistical property to consider for this case is the shape
of the distribution of δ. We should definitely expect this to be influenced by the
choice of the bid-ask spread generator. As the graphs in Figure 4.25 (p. 134) show
this expectation turns out to be correct - for the uniform generators, larger up-
per boundaries generated longer-tailed distributions, while the exponential spread
generator produces the δ distribution with the longest tail out of all four cases.
We can see that the price impact function concavity (Table 4.15 (p. 126)) is
also affected by the chosen spread generator type. For uniform generators, it
would appear to be the case that higher upper boundary for the possible range
of spread values induces greater concavity. On the other hand, the exponential
spread generator produce price impact functions that are less concave than those
in the reference case.
4.7 Turning on Private Information
Having discovered (in Section 4.3 (p. 83)) that, surprisingly, varying the type
of public information generator does not affect our simulated market’s statistical
properties as much as we could perhaps expect, we turn to studying the effects of
private information. Recall that in all simulations so far we have ignored the pri-
vate exogenous information generators ξi(t) completely. For an initial investigation
of private information effects we consider two variations on our reference case in
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Section 4.1 (p. 78):
 “Pure” private information (setting the public information weighting wi =
0 ∀i)
 Intermittent public information. Here we specify that public information
generator ξˆ(t) produces a value from standard uniform distribution with prob-
ability 0.1 on each turns. In other words, we would expect that, on average,
there will be a public information value available on 10% of the total turns
in each run. We set the public information weighting to 1 for all agents, so
that they ignore private information when public information is available,
and use private information at all other times. (Recall that the value of wi
only matters when information from both sources is available)
Effectively, in both cases described above we model pure information effects, but
the second case has intermittent public signals. The latter is probably a more
realistic setting than either pure public or pure private information scenarios.
4.7.1 Results
Both plots of the estimated Hill index values (Figure 4.8c (p. 107), Figure 4.8d
(p. 107)) show that there is a remarkable difference between pure public and pure
private information cases, with the latter displaying much higher index values. In
fact, for quantile values up to approximately 5% the estimated Hill index values
lie in the “target” range [2.5, 3.5]. The difference in sample kurtosis estimates (Ta-
ble 4.7 (p. 113)) is even more striking, with pure private information producing
a value of around 20.0. This is much lower than the pure public sample kurtosis
estimate of around 130 - perhaps even too low. It is also interesting to note that
the intermittent public information case produces results that are much closer to
that of pure private information. The Hill index values are higher for the inter-
mittent case, as compared to the pure private setup, but not by much. Clearly the
occasional availability of a public signal does not have a major effect on the tail
shape of the log-return distribution.
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Private information also has a marked effect on the autocorrelation structure.
As can be seen in Figure 4.17b (p. 121), absolute returns ACF decreases slower
under both private and intermittent public information. Although there is also
a difference in the behaviour of return ACF (see Figure 4.17a (p. 121)), in that,
under public information, it recovers from the initial negative dip more quickly,
this only affects the first few lags, as in all cases return ACF settles at 0 quite
quickly. Consequently the difference between absolute and actual return ACFs
decays more gradually for private and intermittent public cases (Figure 4.17c (p.
121)). In addition to that, both of those cases display no sign of the absolute
returns ACF dipping below 0 that we have been consistently observing in most
previous simulations with pure public information. The modified R/S statistic
(Figure 4.17d (p. 121)) also confirms that the memory effects are more obvious
with private (and intermittent public) information.
Interestingly, the concavity of the price impact function is stronger for the two
private information cases than it is for pure public information case (Table 4.16
(p. 127)). The δ distribution shapes in Figure 4.26 (p. 135) also clearly differ
depending on whether the private information is switched on or not, but no power
laws seem to be forthcoming.
4.8 Changing the Type of Endogenous Informa-
tion Belief Adjustment
4.8.1 Setup
So far we have not used the endogenous information belief adjustment algorithms
defined in 3.1.2 (p. 47) in any of our simulation setups. In other words, in all cases
considered up to this point the agents were of the “NA” type. We will now test
the effects of turning on market-endogenous information processing, by comparing
the following three cases:
1. 100 NA agents (the reference case in Section 4.1 (p. 78))
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2. 100 MR (mean-reverting) agents
3. 100 TF (trend-following) agents
4.8.2 Results
The Hill index plots Figure 4.9c (p. 108)-Figure 4.9d (p. 108) show that the
mean-reverting type of belief-adjustment behaviour produces values of the Hill in-
dex estimate that are larger than those generated in the reference case, implying
lower incidence of extreme price moves. This should not be very surprising, since
the mean-reverting type of belief adjustment is designed to effectively dampen the
magnitude of price swings. One might also have expected that the simulation with
TF agents would produce values of Hill index that are lower than those observed
for NA agents, but this does not appear to have happened, at least not in any
consistent manner (although it is true that Hill index values for TF agents are
smaller than those for NA agents for larger tail quantiles). It is, nevertheless true
that Hill index values for TF agents are lower than those for MR agents.
The structure of log-return autocorrelations (presented in Figure 4.18a (p. 122)
- Figure 4.18c (p. 122)) does not seem to be influenced by the type of endoge-
nous information adjustment. However, the graph of the modified R/S statistic
Figure 4.18d (p. 122) shows something interesting - the long term memory effect
in the log-returns is stronger for TF agents than it is for NA agents, and stronger
for NA agents than it is for MR agents. This is something that one might expect to
find, given the definition of MR (mean-reverting) and TF (trend-following) agents,
although, admittedly, the differences between the three cases are not very large.
As far as the limit order book structure is concerned, it seems that neither the
price impact function concavity (Table 4.17 (p. 127)), for the distribution of limit
order placement from best (Figure 4.27 (p. 136)) are noticeably affected by the
choice of belief adjustment type.
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4.9 Varying the Number of Time Steps
4.9.1 Setup
Thus far, we have kept the number of time steps in each simulation run at 1000.
This parameter value is rather arbitrary, and we should definitely try to investigate
what would happen if we do change the length of our simulation. To this end, we
consider three additional cases with number of time steps fixed at 500, 1500 and
2000 respectively. All other parameters are the same as in the reference case.
4.9.2 Results
Looking at the normal QQ plot as well as the two Hill index plots of the observed
log-returns in Figure 4.10 (p. 109), we can see an interesting pattern. Although the
differences between the graphs are relatively small, there is a clear pattern linking
longer simulations with an increased incidence of extreme price moves (“fatter”
tails). This pattern is even more pronounced in the sample log-return kurtosis
values in Table 4.9 (p. 114) - those very clearly do increase with the number of
time steps.
Unlike the various log-return statistics, the autocorrelation function graphs Figure 4.19a
(p. 123) - Figure 4.19c (p. 123) do not appear to be affected by the number of
time steps in simulation. There is, however, evidence in Figure 4.19d (p. 123)
that the behaviour of the modified R/S statistic does depend on the number of
time steps (with shorter simulations producing slightly less evidence of long-term
memory effects), but the difference is not very large.
Interestingly, the price impact function concavity is also affected by simulation
length - Table 4.18 (p. 128) suggests that concavity seems to increase with the
number of time steps. The bid/ask placement distribution on the other hand is
less affected, although Hill index plots for δ do suggest different shape of the tails
of the distribution of δ for varying number of time steps.
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Overall, we can conclude that the number of time steps in the simulation is impor-
tant, in particular there is some evidence that incidence of extreme price moves
increases with the number of time steps. It has been previously suggested (see e.g.
Mantegna and Stanley (2007)) that the properties of real-world return time-series
vary depending on the length of the time window analysed. It would therefore be
an interesting direction for future work to try to find out whether the response of
the properties of our simulated time series to a change in the length of the simula-
tion corresponds to this dependence of real-world statistical time-series properties
on the time window.
4.10 Additional Analysis
4.10.1 Criticality
We will first address the issue of criticality in our simulated market. According to
Sornette (2006) critical systems display large susceptibility to external factors and
strong correlations between different parts of the systems, resulting from a cascade
of correlations occurring at all existing scales in the system. In other words, self-
similar behaviour in a critical complex system (characterised mathematically by
power laws) is not restricted to a particular scale (often called characteristic scale).
In our specific case, we can look at the behaviour of the power laws present in
the tails of the log-returns distribution as we increase the scale of system (charac-
terised by the number of agents in the population). If we see any evidence of power
laws breaking down (or their extent diminishing) then it is likely that our system
is not critical in this particular sense, and that therefore it is quite possible that
as the number of agents increases, we will eventually see some kind of averaging
effect leading to Gaussian (non-power law) behaviour.
To this end, we will revisit our analysis of the dependence of model results on
agent numbers in Section 4.2 (p. 81). (Recall that there we performed simulations
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of our model with 50, 100, 200 and 500 agents). We will use log-log plots of the
histograms of (absolute values of) log-returns for the four cases under considera-
tion in order to gain some insight into the qualitative features of the power-laws
present in the log-return distributions.
The results are presented in Figure 4.29a (p. 144). At the first glance, there does
not appear to be any significant differences between the power laws (represented
by those segments of the plots that form approximate straight lines) observed in
all cases - we certainly do not appear to observe a breakdown of the power law
behaviour. For greater clarity we have produced the same plot with a constant
horizontal shifts added to the cases of 100, 200 and 500 agents (this was accom-
plished by multiplying the original frequencies by 101, 102 and 103 respectively) 2
- see Figure 4.29b (p. 144). In this latter plot, the line corresponding to the case
of 500 agents arguably produces a power-law segment that is somewhat “better”
(more straight) than that for the case of 50 agents.
We can therefore conclude that there does not appear to be any breakdown of
scaling at larger system sizes, and that there is some evidence that the system we
are modelling is critical. We should not, however, overestimate the strength of
this evidence - clearly we will need to conduct the same study with much larger
system sizes before we can make more definite statements about criticality in our
model.
4.10.2 Agent Wealth Redistribution
Here we will take a closer look at the redistributive effects of our artificial market.
In particular we will be interested in finding out whether the it is the case that
“the rich remain rich”, i.e. how the wealth ranking of the agents changes in the
course of the simulation. By wealth here we mean the total wealth of an agent,
that is C+Qm - the sum of the cash position and the asset position valued at the
2We can do this, since we are primarily interested in the qualitative features of the log-log
plots, rather then the actual values on the vertical axis
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most recent relevant mark-to-market price.
To get an idea of how the wealth ranking might change, we will take the setup
of our reference simulation case in Section 4.1 (p. 78) and compare the vector of
the total wealth of the initial agent population w0 with that of agent population
at the end of the simulation wT . More specifically, for each simulation run we will
compute a measure of rank correlation between the two vectors, which we will then
average across the simulation runs. This will provide with a simple and quantifi-
able way of determining whether the wealth ranking at the end of the simulation
is significantly different from that at the beginning.
There are two widely-used measures of rank correlation - Spearman’s rho (ρS)
and Kendall’s tau (τK). For two samples of equal size x1, . . . xn and y1 . . . yn, with
sample means x¯ and y¯ respectively, the former is defined as
ρS =
∑
i = 1n
(
r(xi)− ¯r(x)
) (
r(yi)− ¯r(y)
)
∑n
i=1
(
r(xi)− ¯r(x)
)2∑n
i=1
(
r(xi)− ¯r(x)
)2 (4.10.2.1)
where r(·) is a function assigning a rank to an element within a sample. In other
words, ρs is calculated by applying the standard product moment correlation co-
efficient to the ranks of the sample data.
Kendall’s tau is defined in terms of the so-called concordant and discordant pairs
of observations. More precisely, given two observations (xi, yi) and (xj , yj) we say
that they are
1. concordant if xi > xj and yi > yj , or if xi < xj and yi < yj
2. discordant if xi > xj and yi < yj, or if xi < xj and yi > yj
3. neither concordant, nor discordant otherwise
Denoting the sets of concordant and discordant pairs in the sample of size n by
Cn and Dn respectively, we define Kendall’s tau as
τK =
|Cn| − |Dn|
1
2
n (n− 1) (4.10.2.2)
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i.e. the difference between the number of concordant and discordant pairs divided
by the total number of pairs.
Both measures of rank correlation are normalised to produce value in the range
[−1, 1], with 1 indicating a perfect rank correlation. Although the two correla-
tions coefficients have somewhat differing interpretations (for instance, according
to Nelsen (1992) ρS is a measure of average positive and negative quadrant depen-
dence, while τK is a measure of total average positivity and reverse regularity),
these differences are not particularly important for our analysis. We will therefore
proceed to use both types of rank correlation measures.
The results are presented in Table 4.28 (p. 143) (as always the numbers in paren-
theses are the sample standard deviations). We observe that both rank correlation
coefficients are very close to 1, and this result appear to be fairly stable across
different simulation runs in this case, as the standard deviations are fairly low.
This indicates that, at least for the reference case setup investigated here, our
market does not redistribute wealth very well - the agents who were at the top of
the wealth distribution in the beginning remain at the top in the end, and those
starting at the bottom remain at the bottom.
4.10.3 Simulation Errors
We will now investigate the dependence of our simulation results on the number
of simulation runs. We are particularly interested in the standard errors of our
estimated parameters.
Recall that our reference case simulation was setup with the number of runs equal
to 100. For the purposes of this section, we will take the reference case and re-run
it with 50, 200 and 500 runs, keeping all other parameters constant. We will then
look at both the average values and standard errors of
1. The Hill index estimates of the left tail of the log-returns distribution
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2. The autocorrelation of absolute returns
We chose those parameters since they represent two important aspects of the out-
put of our model (scaling behaviour and autocorrelations on log-returns). We will
omit the analysis of the Hill index of the right tail, as we have not seen any evi-
dence of asymmetry in the distribution of log-returns in the model thus far.
The results are presented in Figure 4.30 (p. 145). We can see that the plots
of Hill index value estimates in Figure 4.30a (p. 145) are more or less the same in
all four cases. There is a small tendency for the value of the estimated power-law
exponent to increases with the number of simulations - this could perhaps be at-
tributed to a fact that the importance of large price moves decreases somewhat in
larger sample sizes. The standard errors of the Hill index estimates in Figure 4.30b
(p. 145) are relatively large for the smaller quantiles, but do go down fairly quickly
as we move the cut-off point further away from the lower extreme of the distri-
bution. This is not unexpected, since the further away from the center of the
distribution out chosen cut-off point lies, the less values there will be in the tail.
Note also that the errors appear largely the same across all four cases, although
the standard errors of the case with 500 runs are slightly more stable than the rest.
Interestingly, the plots of the average values of autocorrelation of absolute returns
for different lags in Figure 4.30c (p. 145) indicate that there is no discernible dif-
ference between the four cases as far autocorrelations are concerned. This suggests
that the time-dependent properties of our log-return series are quite stable. We
can also see that the standard errors of autocorrelation values in Figure 4.30d (p.
145) are relatively small. Here, again, we see no significant differences between
the four cases, although the case with 500 runs does produce less volatile standard
errors.
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4.11 Graphs and Tables
This section holds the graphs and tables describing various properties of the sim-
ulated markets that are referred to by the preceding analysis. It is organised as
follows:
 Section 4.11.1 (p. 101) illustrates the properties of the distribution of simu-
lated log-returns, with
– Plots of estimated density function, normal Q-Q plots and Hill index
estimates for both tails of the log-return distribution on pp. 101 - 108
– Tables with values of log-return sample moment estimates (standard
deviation, skewness and excess kurtosis) on pp. 110 - 113
 Section 4.11.2 (p. 115) on pp. 115 - 122 illustrates the memory properties
of the log-return time-series (the plots of the autocorrelation functions of
returns and absolute returns, as well the difference between those two and
the modified R/S statistic plot)
 Section 4.11.3 (p. 124) contains the graphs and tables related to the structure
of the simulated limit order book, specifically
– Tables with estimates of the concavity parameter for the virtual price
impact function for both sides of the limit order book on pp. 124 - 127
– Plots of density function and Hill index estimates for the distribution
of limit order placement distances (from best competing order) for both
sides of the limit order book on pp. 129 - 136
 Section 4.11.4 (p. 138) on pp. 138 - 141 contains the estimates of the
parameters of Pareto distribution fitted to the terminal distribution of agent
total wealth
Note that all tables display standard error values in brackets underneath the cor-
responding estimated value.
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4.11.1 Log-Returns Distribution
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Figure 4.2: Reference Case - Log-Returns Distribution
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Figure 4.3: Agent Number Effects - Log-Returns Distribution
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Figure 4.4: Public Generator Type Effects - Log-Returns Distribution
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Figure 4.5: Initial Wealth Distribution Effects - Log-Returns Distribution
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Figure 4.6: Uniform Wealth Distribution Effects - Log-Returns Distribution
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Figure 4.7: Spread Generator Type Effects - Log-Returns Distribution
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Figure 4.8: Private Information Effects - Log-Returns Distribution
4.11 Graphs and Tables 108
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
50
00
−0.005 0.000 0.005
    100 NA agents
    100 MR agents
    100 TF agents
Endogenous Processing Type Effects
Empirical Density
−
0.
00
5
0.
00
0
0.
00
5
−2 −1 0 1 2
    100 NA agents
    100 MR agents
    100 TF agents
Endogenous Processing Type Effects
Normal Q−Q Plot
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
cut−off quantile, %
ta
il 
ex
po
ne
nt
 e
st
im
at
or
2 4 6 8 10
    100 NA agents
    100 MR agents
    100 TF agents
Endogenous Processing Type Effects
Left Tail (Hill Index)
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
cut−off quantile, %
ta
il 
ex
po
ne
nt
 e
st
im
at
or
2 4 6 8 10
    100 NA agents
    100 MR agents
    100 TF agents
Endogenous Processing Type Effects
Right Tail (Hill Index)
Figure 4.9: Endogenous Information Adjustment Type Effects - Log-Returns Dis-
tribution
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Figure 4.10: Simulation Length Effects - Log-Returns Distribution
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standard deviation skewness excess kurtosis
Reference Case 1.1662× 10−3 4.2758× 10−3 1.3027× 102
( 1.2977× 10−4) ( 3.0022) ( 2.1689× 102)
Table 4.1: Reference Case - Log-Return Sample Moments
standard deviation skewness excess kurtosis
50 NA agents 1.6150× 10−3 1.5082× 10−2 2.8999× 101
( 9.3743× 10−5) ( 1.0881) ( 2.9168× 101)
100 NA agents 1.1662× 10−3 4.2758× 10−3 1.3027× 102
( 1.2977× 10−4) ( 3.0022) ( 2.1689× 102)
200 NA agents 1.0031× 10−3 3.5423 5.7647× 102
( 1.7125× 10−4) ( 1.0743× 101) ( 9.7867× 102)
500 NA agents 8.1049× 10−4 −2.5270 1.0437× 103
( 1.2942× 10−4) ( 1.0183× 101) ( 1.1299× 103)
Table 4.2: Agent Number Effects - Log-Return Sample Moments
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standard deviation skewness excess kurtosis
Beta(1.0) (Uniform) 1.1662× 10−3 4.2758× 10−3 1.3027× 102
( 1.2977× 10−4) ( 3.0022) ( 2.1689× 102)
Beta(1.5) 1.1261× 10−3 −5.3752× 10−1 9.1052× 101
( 1.4688× 10−4) ( 4.1153) ( 1.9608× 102)
Beta(2.5) 1.3236× 10−3 −2.3611× 10−1 8.7610× 101
( 2.9569× 10−4) ( 5.2857) ( 1.2830× 102)
Beta(0.5) 1.3016× 10−3 −3.2447× 10−1 1.5011× 102
( 1.0241× 10−4) ( 2.9437) ( 1.5444× 102)
Table 4.3: Public Information Generator Type Effects - Log-Return Sample Mo-
ments
standard deviation skewness excess kurtosis
Pareto(10k, 1.4) 1.1662× 10−3 4.2758× 10−3 1.3027× 102
( 1.2977× 10−4) ( 3.0022) ( 2.1689× 102)
Pareto(10k, 1.0) 1.1580× 10−3 −3.9764× 10−1 1.1604× 102
( 1.2602× 10−4) ( 3.0188) ( 1.9910× 102)
Pareto(10k, 2.0) 1.1254× 10−3 −1.6019 1.3467× 102
( 1.2033× 10−4) ( 4.5904) ( 2.9205× 102)
Table 4.4: Initial Wealth Distribution Effects - Log-Return Sample Moments
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standard deviation skewness excess kurtosis
Pareto (10k, 1.4) wealth 1.1662× 10−3 4.2758× 10−3 1.3027× 102
( 1.2977× 10−4) ( 3.0022) ( 2.1689× 102)
Uniform(10k, 60k) wealth 1.1344× 10−3 −1.8836 1.2405× 102
( 1.2719× 10−4) ( 4.6021) ( 2.9098× 102)
Uniform(10k,200k) wealth 1.1596× 10−3 −1.1111 1.3620× 102
( 1.6696× 10−4) ( 2.9981) ( 2.5211× 102)
Table 4.5: Uniform Wealth Distribution Effects - Log-Return Sample Moments
standard deviation skewness excess kurtosis
Uniform(0.001, 0.01) 1.1662× 10−3 4.2758× 10−3 1.3027× 102
( 1.2977× 10−4) ( 3.0022) ( 2.1689× 102)
Uniform(0.001, 0.05) 7.2508× 10−3 4.7438 2.4172× 102
( 8.3937× 10−4) ( 4.9316) ( 1.7512× 102)
Uniform(0.001, 0.1) 1.5961× 10−2 6.8925 3.3587× 102
( 3.4314× 10−3) ( 7.1317) ( 3.5068× 102)
Exp(1/0.0055) 2.4142× 10−3 8.9312× 10−1 1.5924× 102
( 2.2893× 10−4) ( 3.0689) ( 1.6306× 102)
Table 4.6: Spread Generator Type Effects - Log-Return Sample Moments
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standard deviation skewness excess kurtosis
Pure Public 1.1662× 10−3 4.2758× 10−3 1.3027× 102
( 1.2977× 10−4) ( 3.0022) ( 2.1689× 102)
Pure Private 2.1937× 10−3 1.4642 5.5520× 101
( 4.1734× 10−5) ( 6.2265× 10−1) ( 2.5276× 101)
Public Intermittent(0.1) 2.0301× 10−3 4.6838× 10−1 2.3984× 101
( 3.9572× 10−5) ( 3.3506× 10−1) ( 1.2489× 101)
Table 4.7: Private Information Effects - Log-Return Sample Moments
standard deviation skewness excess kurtosis
100 NA agents 1.1662× 10−3 4.2758× 10−3 1.3027× 102
( 1.2977× 10−4) ( 3.0022) ( 2.1689× 102)
100 MR agents 1.6028× 10−3 5.3006× 10−1 1.7407× 102
( 2.1637× 10−4) ( 2.7615) ( 2.2105× 102)
100 TF agents 1.9735× 10−3 2.1677 3.2341× 102
( 2.4854× 10−4) ( 4.4141) ( 3.0401× 102)
Table 4.8: Endogenous Information Adjustment Type Effects - Log-Return Sample
Moments
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standard deviation skewness excess kurtosis
1000 steps 1.1662× 10−3 4.2758× 10−3 1.3027× 102
( 1.2977× 10−4) ( 3.0022) ( 2.1689× 102)
500 steps 1.1364× 10−3 −6.8479× 10−1 7.9062× 101
( 1.3209× 10−4) ( 2.9397) ( 1.3926× 102)
1500 steps 1.2279× 10−3 2.5348× 10−1 2.0405× 102
( 1.3759× 10−4) ( 4.9854) ( 2.9234× 102)
2000 steps 1.3017× 10−3 3.1454 4.1653× 102
( 1.6173× 10−4) ( 7.1781) ( 5.7274× 102)
Table 4.9: Simulation Length Effects - Log-Return Sample Moments
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4.11.2 Log-Returns Memory Structure
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Figure 4.11: Reference Case - Log-Returns Memory Structure
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Figure 4.12: Agent Number Effects - Log-Returns Memory Structure
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Figure 4.13: Public Information Generator Type Effects - Log-Returns Memory
Structure
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Figure 4.14: Initial Wealth Distribution Effects - Log-Returns Memory Structure
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Figure 4.15: UniformWealth Distribution Effects - Log-Returns Memory Structure
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Figure 4.16: Spread Generator Type Effects - Log-Returns Memory Structure
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Figure 4.17: Private Information Effects - Log-Returns Memory Structure
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Figure 4.18: Endogenous Information Adjustment Type Effects - Log-Returns
Memory Structure
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Figure 4.19: Simulation Length Effects - Log-Returns Memory Structure
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4.11.3 Limit Order Book Properties
ask concavity bid concavity
Reference Case 0.7918 0.7912
( 0.0140) ( 0.0129)
Table 4.10: Reference Case - Price Impact Function Concavity
ask concavity bid concavity
50 NA agents 0.7522 0.7471
( 0.0212) ( 0.0198)
100 NA agents 0.7918 0.7912
( 0.0140) ( 0.0129)
200 NA agents 0.7836 0.7872
( 0.0228) ( 0.0205)
500 NA agents 0.8920 0.8923
( 0.0063) ( 0.0066)
Table 4.11: Agent Number Effects - Price Impact Function Concavity
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ask concavity bid concavity
Beta(1.0) (Uniform) 0.7918 0.7912
( 0.0140) ( 0.0129)
Beta(1.5) 0.7899 0.7926
( 0.0210) ( 0.0194)
Beta(2.5) 0.8104 0.8115
( 0.0309) ( 0.0353)
Beta(0.5) 0.8154 0.8176
( 0.0084) ( 0.0101)
Table 4.12: Public Information Generator Type Effects - Price Impact Function
Concavity
ask concavity bid concavity
Pareto(10k, 1.4) 0.7918 0.7912
( 0.0140) ( 0.0129)
Pareto(10k, 1.0) 0.8045 0.8031
( 0.0106) ( 0.0115)
Pareto(10k, 2.0) 0.8580 0.8584
( 0.0069) ( 0.0077)
Table 4.13: Initial Wealth Distribution Effects - Price Impact Function Concavity
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ask concavity bid concavity
Pareto (10k, 1.4) wealth 0.7918 0.7912
( 0.0140) ( 0.0129)
Uniform(10k, 60k) wealth 0.8760 0.8766
( 0.0058) ( 0.0067)
Uniform(10k,200k) wealth 0.8615 0.8609
( 0.0065) ( 0.0064)
Table 4.14: Uniform Wealth Distribution Effects - Price Impact Function Concav-
ity
ask concavity bid concavity
Uniform(0.001, 0.01) 0.7918 0.7912
( 0.0140) ( 0.0129)
Uniform(0.001, 0.05) 0.6761 0.6771
( 0.0234) ( 0.0260)
Uniform(0.001, 0.1) 0.6871 0.6880
( 0.0257) ( 0.0268)
Exp(1/0.0055) 0.8551 0.8548
( 0.0313) ( 0.0266)
Table 4.15: Spread Generator Type Effects - Price Impact Function Concavity
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ask concavity bid concavity
Pure Public 0.7918 0.7912
( 0.0140) ( 0.0129)
Pure Private 0.6664 0.6923
( 0.0110) ( 0.0116)
Public Intermittent(0.1) 0.6884 0.7029
( 0.0107) ( 0.0115)
Table 4.16: Private Information Effects - Price Impact Function Concavity
ask concavity bid concavity
100 NA agents 0.7918 0.7912
( 0.0140) ( 0.0129)
100 MR agents 0.7870 0.7890
( 0.0125) ( 0.0126)
100 TF agents 0.8195 0.8228
( 0.0108) ( 0.0104)
Table 4.17: Endogenous Information Adjustment Type Effects - Price Impact
Function Concavity
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ask concavity bid concavity
1000 steps 0.7918 0.7912
( 0.0140) ( 0.0129)
500 steps 0.8118 0.8092
( 0.0154) ( 0.0138)
1500 steps 0.7506 0.7462
( 0.0213) ( 0.0231)
2000 steps 0.6891 0.6915
( 0.0178) ( 0.0173)
Table 4.18: Simulation Length Effects - Price Impact Function Concavity
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Figure 4.20: Reference Case - Limit Order Placement From Best
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Figure 4.21: Agent Number Effects - Limit Order Placement From Best
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Figure 4.22: Public Generator Type Effects - Limit Order Placement From Best
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Figure 4.23: Initial Wealth Distribution Effects - Limit Order Placement From
Best
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Figure 4.24: Uniform Wealth Distribution Effects - Limit Order Placement From
Best
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Figure 4.25: Spread Generator Type Effects - Limit Order Placement From Best
4.11 Graphs and Tables 135
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
    Pure Public
    Pure Private
    Public Intermittent(0.1)
Public Private Information Generator Combination Effects
Ask Empirical Density
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
    Pure Public
    Pure Private
    Public Intermittent(0.1)
Public Private Information Generator Combination Effects
Bid Empirical Density
10
15
20
cut−off quantile
ta
il 
ex
po
ne
nt
 e
st
im
at
or
2 4 6 8 10
    Pure Public
    Pure Private
    Public Intermittent(0.1)
Public Private Information Generator Combination Effects
Ask Placement (Hill Index)
10
15
20
25
cut−off quantile
ta
il 
ex
po
ne
nt
 e
st
im
at
or
2 4 6 8 10
    Pure Public
    Pure Private
    Public Intermittent(0.1)
Public Private Information Generator Combination Effects
Bid Placement (Hill Index)
Figure 4.26: Private Information Effects - Limit Order Placement From Best
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Figure 4.27: Endogenous Information Adjustment Type Effects - Limit Order
Placement From Best
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Figure 4.28: Simulation Length Effects - Limit Order Placement From Best
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4.11.4 Terminal Wealth Distribution Statistics
αˆ(T ) xˆm(T ) ǫ(αˆ(T ))
Reference Case 1.1674 9.1276× 103 1.1674× 10−1
( 5.6843× 10−2) ( 4.0162× 102) ( 5.6843× 10−3)
Table 4.19: Reference Case - Terminal Wealth Distribution Statistics
αˆ(T ) xˆm(T ) ǫ(αˆ(T ))
50 NA agents 1.4228 9.3784× 103 2.0121× 10−1
( 7.5304× 10−2) ( 4.0069× 102) ( 1.0650× 10−2)
100 NA agents 1.1674 9.1276× 103 1.1674× 10−1
( 5.6843× 10−2) ( 4.0162× 102) ( 5.6843× 10−3)
200 NA agents 1.2253 8.4059× 103 8.6639× 10−2
( 7.8588× 10−2) ( 4.9108× 102) ( 5.5570× 10−3)
500 NA agents 9.1590× 10−1 6.9977× 103 4.0960× 10−2
( 7.4257× 10−2) ( 6.5058× 102) ( 3.3209× 10−3)
Table 4.20: Agent Number Effects - Terminal Wealth Distribution Statistics
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αˆ(T ) xˆm(T ) ǫ(αˆ(T ))
Beta(1.0) (Uniform) 1.1674 9.1276× 103 1.1674× 10−1
( 5.6843× 10−2) ( 4.0162× 102) ( 5.6843× 10−3)
Beta(1.5) 1.4838 9.4725× 103 1.4838× 10−1
( 6.9860× 10−2) ( 3.3049× 102) ( 6.9860× 10−3)
Beta(2.5) 1.5224 9.6599× 103 1.5224× 10−1
( 4.6416× 10−2) ( 2.2036× 102) ( 4.6416× 10−3)
Beta(0.5) 1.3291 8.6240× 103 1.3291× 10−1
( 1.0252× 10−1) ( 5.3063× 102) ( 1.0252× 10−2)
Table 4.21: Public Information Generator Type Effects - Terminal Wealth Distri-
bution Statistics
αˆ(T ) xˆm(T ) ǫ(αˆ(T ))
Pareto(10k, 1.4) 1.1674 9.1276× 103 1.1674× 10−1
( 5.6843× 10−2) ( 4.0162× 102) ( 5.6843× 10−3)
Pareto(10k, 1.0) 1.0667 9.3387× 103 1.0667× 10−1
( 4.4470× 10−2) ( 4.0983× 102) ( 4.4470× 10−3)
Pareto(10k, 2.0) 1.6096 9.2527× 103 1.6096× 10−1
( 1.1093× 10−1) ( 4.0823× 102) ( 1.1093× 10−2)
Table 4.22: Initial Wealth Distribution Effects - Terminal Wealth Distribution
Statistics
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αˆ(T ) xˆm(T ) ǫ(αˆ(T ))
Pareto (10k, 1.4) wealth 1.1674 9.1276× 103 1.1674× 10−1
( 5.6843× 10−2) ( 4.0162× 102) ( 5.6843× 10−3)
Uniform(10k, 60k) wealth 8.5432× 10−1 9.5875× 103 8.5432× 10−2
( 3.8630× 10−2) ( 5.1348× 102) ( 3.8630× 10−3)
Uniform(10k,200k) wealth 4.8623× 10−1 1.0886× 104 4.8623× 10−2
( 1.6156× 10−2) ( 7.4983× 102) ( 1.6156× 10−3)
Table 4.23: Uniform Wealth Distribution Effects - Terminal Wealth Distribution
Statistics
αˆ(T ) xˆm(T ) ǫ(αˆ(T ))
Uniform(0.001, 0.01) 1.1674 9.1276× 103 1.1674× 10−1
( 5.6843× 10−2) ( 4.0162× 102) ( 5.6843× 10−3)
Uniform(0.001, 0.05) 6.7776× 10−1 4.8783× 103 6.7776× 10−2
( 7.8993× 10−2) ( 1.1708× 103) ( 7.8993× 10−3)
Uniform(0.001, 0.1) 4.5357× 10−1 1.6513× 103 4.5357× 10−2
( 7.3804× 10−2) ( 9.3844× 102) ( 7.3804× 10−3)
Exp(1/0.0055) 1.1610 8.3677× 103 1.1610× 10−1
( 8.4383× 10−2) ( 5.6092× 102) ( 8.4383× 10−3)
Table 4.24: Spread Generator Type Effects - Terminal Wealth Distribution Statis-
tics
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αˆ(T ) xˆm(T ) ǫ(αˆ(T ))
Pure Public 1.1674 9.1276× 103 1.1674× 10−1
( 5.6843× 10−2) ( 4.0162× 102) ( 5.6843× 10−3)
Pure Private 1.2251 7.8089× 103 1.2251× 10−1
( 9.2476× 10−2) ( 5.7392× 102) ( 9.2476× 10−3)
Public Intermittent(0.1) 1.1714 8.6122× 103 1.1714× 10−1
( 8.2169× 10−2) ( 5.8370× 102) ( 8.2169× 10−3)
Table 4.25: Private Information Effects - Terminal Wealth Distribution Statistics
αˆ(T ) xˆm(T ) ǫ(αˆ(T ))
100 NA agents 1.1674 9.1276× 103 1.1674× 10−1
( 5.6843× 10−2) ( 4.0162× 102) ( 5.6843× 10−3)
100 MR agents 1.2063 9.1137× 103 1.2063× 10−1
( 5.9643× 10−2) ( 3.7538× 102) ( 5.9643× 10−3)
100 TF agents 1.1787 8.2193× 103 1.1787× 10−1
( 1.0088× 10−1) ( 6.4985× 102) ( 1.0088× 10−2)
Table 4.26: Endogenous Information Adjustment Type Effects - Terminal Wealth
Distribution Statistics
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αˆ(T ) xˆm(T ) ǫ(αˆ(T ))
1000 steps 1.1674 9.1276× 103 1.1674× 10−1
( 5.6843× 10−2) ( 4.0162× 102) ( 5.6843× 10−3)
500 steps 1.1000 9.5562× 103 1.1000× 10−1
( 3.2949× 10−2) ( 2.7437× 102) ( 3.2949× 10−3)
1500 steps 1.2939 8.4708× 103 1.2939× 10−1
( 7.8965× 10−2) ( 5.6560× 102) ( 7.8965× 10−3)
2000 steps 1.0244 8.2563× 103 1.0244× 10−1
( 5.2943× 10−2) ( 5.5660× 102) ( 5.2943× 10−3)
Table 4.27: Simulation Length Effects - Terminal Wealth Distribution Statistics
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4.11.5 Additional Analysis
average value
ρS 0.9855
(3.938× 10−3)
τK 0.9115
(1.250× 10−2)
Table 4.28: Agent Wealth Rank Correlation Estimates (Initial-to-Final)
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Figure 4.29: Log-Log Histograms of Absolute Log-Returns
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Figure 4.30: Stability of Simulation Results
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4.12 Discussion
4.12.1 Reproducing Statistical Properties of Real Finan-
cial Markets
The simulation results presented in the previous sections indicate that our model
has little difficulty in reproducing power-law behaviour in the tails of the log-return
distribution (“fat tails”). If anything, the estimated power-law exponent (as mea-
sured by the Hill index) is often too extreme - implying incidence of extreme price
move that is even higher than that observed in reality. Nevertheless, in some cases
(e.g. with private information generators, or for mean-reverting agents) we were
able to obtain values of the Hill index that are in much better correspondence with
empirically estimated ones, suggesting that our model is quite capable of repro-
ducing this particular aspect of real financial markets.
The model also appears to be able to reproduce volatility clustering - we have ob-
served that the autocorrelation of absolute log-returns declines more slowly than
that of actual log-returns in all cases considered. Again, it must be pointed out
that the extent of this difference in speeds of decline varies from case to case, but
the overall pattern is clearly present. We have also observed that the autocorre-
lation of returns is negative for the first few lags. Although this is not a universal
feature of high-frequency data, there is evidence that low-order autocorrelations
are negative for some log-return time series (Zhou (1996)). Additionally, the com-
puted values of the modified R/S statistic indicate that our simulated returns
exhibit long-term dependence.
Overall, it would appear that the ability of the model to replicate statistical prop-
erties of the log-return distributions observed in financial markets is satisfactory.
Our attempts to replicate the properties of the limit order book, however, met with
limited success. While the virtual price impact function was concave in shape (in
accordance with real data, see Smith et al. (2003)), we were not able to replicate
the power law that is apparently present in the tail of the distribution of δ, i.e.
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the distances of limit order prices from the concurrent best competing price. For
most test cases, the distribution of δ was not long-tailed at all. As limit order
price formation in our model is controlled explicitly by choosing the type of ran-
dom variable generating the bid-ask spread fraction s, we were able to obtain a
distribution of δ with a relatively long tail for an exponentially generated s, but
the estimated power law exponent value was still quite far from the empirically
observed range of 1.5 - 1.7. Given the apparently ubiquitous nature of this power
law in the distribution of real market δ, it is clear that we cannot claim to have
successfully replicated limit order book properties until the model-generated δ has
similar behaviour.
4.12.2 Model Findings
One of the most interesting results to emerge from our simulations is the fact that
increasing the number of agents in the market seems to increase the incidence of
extreme price moves. This is in sharp contrast to the findings in Alfi et al. (2008),
for example, where greater number of agents was shown to produce less volatile
markets. Of course, our model is quite different from that in Alfi et al. (2008), so
it is not immediately obvious what causes this difference.
We also found that varying the type of public information generator ξˆ does not
affect the statistical properties of the generated prices as much as we could ex-
pect. This is somewhat surprising, but it also reveals something interesting about
the model. While we clearly do need to have some form of external forcing that
updates the agents’ beliefs, it seems that the important statistical properties of
the market (such as presence of extreme price moves, or volatility clustering) do
not depend crucially on the type of information generator chosen. In other words,
those properties are brought about by some other aspect of the model. It may be
instructive to try to understand what that aspect might be.
Now, we have previously stressed that the two main features of our approach
are heterogenous intelligent agents and full model of the market microstructure.
4.12 Discussion 148
Given the fact that the “zero-intelligence” model of Smith et al. (2003) did not
quite manage to replicate power-law tails in the price log-returns, it is somewhat
doubtful that the performance of our model in that area can be attributed to our
modelling the market microstructure on its own. It would then seem logical to
suggest that the statistical features of the log-returns our model generates are at
least in part due to the presence of a population of heterogenous intelligent agents.
In the light of that suggestion, it is interesting to note that the degree of het-
erogeneity (at least as measured by the inequity of the initial wealth distribution)
does not appear to significantly affect the log-return properties we are interested
in either. Given all this, we may formulate the following conjecture: the presence
of heterogenous intelligent agents in a market with a full limit order book model
is sufficient to generate power-law tails in the distribution of log-returns, as well
as volatility clustering.
It should be emphasised that this is merely a conjecture: naturally, simulation-
based methods cannot be used to establish universal validity of such claim. Never-
theless it should be pointed out that the results achieved by the model in Chiarella
et al. (2009), provide some support for our hypothesis.
Finally, it should be noted that we do obtain more realistic results with private
information, as well as with market-endogenous information adjustment (of both
MR and TF types), suggesting that those model features are quite important.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
We set out to construct a “bottom-up” model of a financial market in which in-
dividual participants trade a single asset. In this model trading is motivated by
the agents’ beliefs about the likely direction of the future price moves. Agents
who believe that the asset price will go up submit buy orders to the market, con-
versely agents who believe that the price will go down submit sell orders. In both
cases order sizes are determined by the resources available to agents, as well by
the degree of certainty in their personal beliefs. Orders submitted in this way
are cleared through the standard continuous double auction mechanism, thereby
creating trades.
We have reviewed some examples of existing work in agent-based market mod-
els, which can be broadly split into those that model strategic agent behaviour,
but not the continuous double action market microstructure and those that model
the market microstructure, but not individual agent behaviour (“zero-intelligence
agents”). We have also reviewed a model that combined modelling agent behaviour
with a limit order book model (Chiarella et al. (2009)), an approach that, in our
opinion, possesses some merit. While our model is similar to that described in
Chiarella et al. (2009), there are a few important differences. In particular we did
not feel that the use of expected utility framework for describing human behaviour
was sufficiently well grounded in empirical evidence. Instead, we opted for a sim-
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pler, although admittedly more heuristic model in which an agent made trading
decisions by referencing the proportion of his current resources that he was willing
to put at risk. This proportion was, in turn, determined by the certainty with
which the agent’s belief about the likely future price moves was held.
Due to the inherent complexity of an agent-based model, we chose to study ours
via the means of Monte Carlo simulation. The simulation results indicate that our
model is reasonably capable of reproducing the stylised facts of real-world financial
markets, although the degree of the success of such replication depended on the
set of model input parameters chosen for the simulation. In particular, we have
established that the distribution of simulated log-returns has “fat tails”, implying
a high incidence of extreme price moves (in both directions) in all cases consid-
ered. This, together with results obtained by other agent-based models (such as
Chiarella et al. (2009) and Smith et al. (2003)) motivated us to put forward a con-
jecture according to which it is specifically the presence of heterogenous population
of interacting intelligent agents, together with the continuous double auction order
clearing mechanism, that produces the extreme price moves.
There are, of course, many ways in which the current model can be further in-
vestigated and improved. For the purposes of presentational tractability we have
limited our choice of initial simulation setup to a few cases. This set of cases is by
no means complete - other combinations of model input parameters are possible.
We can, for example ask what happens if we have a very large number of agents,
or what happens if we mix mean-reverting and trend-following agents in the same
population. Following Alfi et al. (2008), one might also like to enable the agents
to change their type (between NA, MR and TF) depending, for instance, on the
economic performance of their current type of behaviour. It is also clear that some
effort needs to be expended making sure we can replicate the remarkably ubiqui-
tous regularity in the placement of limit order prices - so far our simulations have
failed to match that particular property of the real-world limit order books.
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Arguably, the most useful improvement that can be made to the present model
is the addition of a fully specified physical time model. In addition to providing
a greatly increased degree of realism, this will also facilitate calibration of the
model to real markets, since its output would then be directly and unambiguously
comparable to empirical observations of both traded prices and limit order book
properties (which are usually taken at regular intervals of physical time).
It will also be useful to add features to this model that will make it more suitable
for modelling a particular asset class. At the moment we are simply modelling
a generic non-income-bearing asset with no shorting restrictions. While this can
be argued to represent an asset class (foreign exchange seems to be a good fit),
extensions are clearly needed to accommodate other asset classes. If we were to
model equity markets, for example, we would need to take account of the fact
that shorting restrictions, the fact that the total number of shares available is re-
stricted, as well as the existence of dividends all play a important role. Introducing
a multi-asset version of this model is also quite important, particularly if it is ever
to be used for the purposes of market risk modelling.
Finally, we should note that while we did not focus our effort on analytical in-
terpretations of the current model, it would certainly benefit from development in
that direction. While a full analytical model may be difficult to obtain, one can
try taking a simplified version of our current model and attempt to derive some
analytical predictions of market dynamics. This can then be compared to actual
simulation output of the full model, possibly helping to establish which model
features actually matter and which can be simplified away.
Summarising, we have presented an agent-based model of a market in which a
single asset is traded. The model is reasonably capable of reproducing stylised
facts of real financial markets. We have conjectured that the occurrence of ex-
treme price moves in the model is chiefly due to the presence of a population of
heterogenous intelligent agents - a claim that needs to be verified. We have also
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established several ways in which the model can be further improved.
Appendix A
Empirical Evidence of
Behavioural Biases
A.1 Belief Revision Biases
Situations in which we want to form an updated estimate of the probability of
an event , given some newly discovered information are very common in decision-
making. If one wants to carry out such an update in accordance with the axioms of
probability theory, one must resort to some form of Bayes’ formula. For instance,
in simple case, where we have two competing hypotheses H and HC (“not H”),
which we want to evaluate in the light of some evidence E, we may utilise (a form
of ) the Bayes’ formula as follows:
P (H |E)
P (HC |E) =
P (E |H)
P (E |HC) ×
P (H)E
P (HC)E
(A.1.0.1)
or, equivalently
P (H |E)
1− P (H |E) =
P (E |H)
P (E |HC) ×
P (H)E
1− P (H)E (A.1.0.2)
from which P (H |E) may be calculated. The above form of the Bayes’ theorem
is sometimes known as the “Bayes’ formula for odds” since it essentially says that
the posterior odds (of hypothesis being correct) are equal to the likelihood ratio
of the evidence multiplied by the prior odds. This form makes it clear that we
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must take into account both the likelihood ratio and the prior probabilities when
calculating the posterior probabilities.
Now, (A.1.0.1)-(A.1.0.2) provide a normative recipe for the update of estimated
probabilities. It is possible to design psychological experiments to see whether
people actually do update their probabilities in this way. Such experiments have
been conducted and their findings are generally in disagreement with the Bayesian
approach outlined above. That disagreement can be broadly split into two main
types
 Evidence biases, where the subjects incorrectly assign significance to the
prior probabilities
 Prior belief biases where the subjects incorrectly assign significance to the
likelihood of observed evidence.
We will now proceed to examine the above two bias types in more detail.
To see how the evidence bias works, consider an experiment described in Kah-
neman and Tversky (1984), in which were subject were given the following de-
scription of a problem:
“A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab companies,
the Green and the Blue, operate in the city. You are given the following data:
1. 85% of the cabs in the city are Green and 15% are Blue.
2. A witness identified the cab as Blue. The court tested the reliability of
the witness under the same circumstances that existed on the night of the
accident and concluded that the witness correctly identified each one of the
two colours 80% of the time and failed 20% of the time.
What is the probability that the car involved in the accident was Blue rather than
Green?”
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If we denote the hypothesis “the car was Blue” by B and the event “the wit-
ness saw a Blue car” by WB we will find that the description above provides the
following values for the various probabilities involved
 The prior probability of a car being Blue, P (B) = 0.15
 The likelihood of the witness identifying a Blue car as Blue P (WB |B) = 0.8
 The likelihood of the witness identifying a Green car as Blue P
(
WB |BC
)
=
0.2.
If we now use the Bayes’ formula (A.1.0.2) to calculate the required probability,
i.e. P (B |WB) we will find that it is equal to 0.41. The results of the experi-
ment, however, deviated from that number quite significantly. Most subjects gave
the estimate that was higher that 0.5, while some thought that the probability in
question 0.8. The latter group seem to exhibit a relatively common form of judge-
ment bias, the confusion of the inverse bias, which is a specific instance of a more
general confusion between the statements “All X are Y ” and “All Y are X”. In
other words, it seems quite likely that those who gave their answer as 0.8 ignored
the prior odds (the second term of the RHS of (A.1.0.2)) completely when making
their assessment. The general situation seems to be more complicated, however:
most people did not think it was 0.8 but still failed to provide the correct answer
of 0.4, giving some intermediate value. So, it would be an oversimplification to
argue that people do not use the prior probabilities at all. Instead, it appears that
the test subjects did recognise the importance of the prior probabilities, but failed
to take them into account correctly.
In a different experiment, described in Birnbaum and Mellers (1983), the sub-
jects were given a series of problems in which they were asked to evaluate the
probability that particular used cars would last for 3 years. They were provided
with the prior probabilities that cars of the same model and year, e.g. 30% prob-
ability of lasting for 3 years. They were also told that a judge has examined the
car and pronounced it in “good shape” (or “bad shape” in some problems). The
participants were also provided with the statistical reliability of the judge, e.g.
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they were told that the judge correctly identifies the cars that would last 3 years
60% of the time, and also correctly identifies those that would not 60% of the time.
Here, if we denote the event “the car would last 3 years” by L and the event
“judge pronounces the car in good shape” by G, it is clear that the above numbers
lead to the following probabilities:
 The prior probability that a car would last 3 years, P (L) = 0.3
 The likelihood of the judge pronouncing that a car is in good shape when it
actually is in good shape, P (G |L) = 0.6
 The likelihood of the judge pronouncing that a car is in good shape when it
is not, P
(
G |LC) = 1− P (GC |LC) = 0.4
Once again, we should use the Bayes’ theorem to calculate the required probability
P (L |G). However, here, as in the previous example, the results of the experiment
deviated quite significantly from the predictions of the normative theory. The
most interesting deviations were observed when the prior probability was given
as quite high or quite low. For instance, suppose that P (L) = 0.9 and the other
probabilities are as above, then using (A.1.0.2) we find that P (L |G) = 0.93, in
other words, even though the judge’s accuracy is far from perfect, the judgement
does add useful information to the prior probability of 0.9. However, the partici-
pants who were given this particular problem provided estimates for P (L)G that
were considerably lower than 0.9. In this case, it appears that the participants
paid too much attention to the reliability of the judge (which was given as quite
low) and failed to consider the prior probability in an appropriate manner.
A.2 Decision-Making Biases
The normative benchmark for economic decision making is usually assumed to be
provided by the expected utility framework. The (very reasonable) idea behind
that framework is that each person has a utility function that relates a state of
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the world (in the simplest case summarised by the person’s wealth) to a num-
ber that describes how desirable that state of the world is. In the context of
decision-making under uncertainty, we generally assume that decisions are made
by assigning some probability distribution to the possible states of the world, and
proceeding so as to maximise the expected value of the utility function under that
distribution. The various biases described below arise from experiments whose
results are inconsistent with that normative framework.
A.2.1 Context-Dependent Preference Reversal
Some experiments indicate that the weight given to a probability of an event for
the purposes of decision-making may depend on the kind of the decision problem
at hand. Tversky et al. (1988) describe the experiment in which the subjects were
asked to choose between two gambles:
 P Bet: 29/36 probability of winning $2.
 $ Bet: 7/36 probability of winning $9.
Most subjects preferred the P bet. They were also asked how much money the
bets were worth to them. When problem was posed in this way, most subjects
assigned greater monetary values to the $ bet. Clearly, those results cannot be
simultaneously consistent with the expected utility approach - the probabilities as-
signed to the bets are the same and very clearly stated, either one bet maximises
the expected utility or the other. To explain those findings we could hypothe-
sise that either the utility function used in the making of the decision depends
on question being asked, or that the initially given probabilities are transformed
when making a decision, again, depending on the manner in which the question
is posed (or possibly or combination of the two effects). In any case, the results
cannot be explained by traditional utility theory.
This tendency to effectively reverse preferences based on the way in which the
problem is presented (or perceived) has been demonstrated repeatedly, and in dif-
ferent contexts. In one of the most striking examples, (here cited from Kahneman
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and Tversky (1984)) the subjects were presented with the following problem in an
experiment
“Imagine that the US is preparing for an outbreak of an unusual Asian disease,
which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the
disease have been proposed.”
The subjects were also told to assume that the exact scientific estimates of the
consequences of proposed decisions. One group of subjects were given the following
description of the two programs
 Program A: 200 are saved
 Program B: 33% chance of saving 600 people, 66% chance of saving none.
In this group 72% of subjects chose Program A.
A second group was given a different description of the two alternatives
 Program A: 400 die
 Program B: 33% chance that nobody will die, 66% chance that 600 people
will die.
In this latter group, only 22% chose program A. It is clear, however, that if the
state of the world is described by the number of people alive (out of the predicted
600) at the end of each program, there is no difference between the first and the
second description of the two programs. In both cases Program A results in 200
alive with certainty, and Program B produces 33% chance of all 600 being alive,
and 66% chance of the entire 600 dying. So the expected utility of Program A is
the same in both cases, as is the expected utility of Program B, and we should
not expect to observe such a remarkable difference between the preferences for
the programmes in the two subject groups. Note that according to Kahneman
and Tversky (1984) these results are robust, for instance, the preference reversal
pattern is not eliminated even if the same respondents answer the two questions
within a few minutes.
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A.2.2 The Allais Paradox
Another type of very clear violation of expected utility theory was demonstrated
in Allais (1953) (here cited from Baron (1994)). The subjects were given two
situations, both consisting of a choice between two gambles and had to indicate
their preferred gamble in each situation. The gambles were as follows:
 Situation X:
– Option 1: Win $1,000 with probability 1
– Option 2:
* Win $1,000 with probability 0.89
* Win $5,000 with probability 0.1
* Win nothing with probability 0.01
 Situation Y :
– Option 3:
* Win $1,000 with probability 0.11
* Win nothing with probability 0.89
– Option 4:
* Win $5,000 with probability 0.1
* Win nothing with probability 0.9
Most subjects chose option 1 in situation X and option 4 in situation Y . This
result is inconsistent with expected utility approach, regardless of the assumptions
one may make about the utility function. To see why this is the case, suppose
that a person does use maximisation of expected utility as a decision criterion and
chooses option 1 over option 2 in situation X. Then it must be the case that
u(1000) > 0.89u(1000) + 0.1u(5000) + 0.01u(0) (A.2.2.1)
where u(·) is the utility function. If the subject also prefers option 4 to option 3
in situation Y then we also have that
0.1u(5000) + 0.9u(0) > 0.11u(1000) + 0.89u(0) (A.2.2.2)
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It is clear that for the same subject to make the choices outlined above the two
inequalities must hold simultaneously. If we now add (A.2.2.1) and (A.2.2.2) we
fill get the following inequality
u(1000) + 0.1u(5000) + 0.9u(0) > (0.89 + 0.11)u(1000) + 0.1u(5000) + (0.01 + 0.89)u(0)(A.2.2.3)
which simplifies to
0 > 0 (A.2.2.4)
which, obviously, can never be true.
Thus, the expected utility approach cannot ever explain the choice pattern de-
scribed above. One interesting aspect of the problem is that in situation X one
choice yields a certain outcome, whereas in situation Y both choices have random
payoffs. It may be suggested that, in some way, the inconsistency with expected
utility theory is in part due to some “certainty” effect - people “over-weigh” the
certain outcome, thus leading to a deviation from normative predictions.
A.2.3 The Ambiguity Effect
Another important bias that people are susceptible to in their decision-making
is the ambiguity effect, which means that we tend to avoid risks associated with
situations for which the probabilities seems “unknown”. This effect has been
described, for example in Ellsberg (1961): the subjects were told that an urn
contains 90 balls, with 30 red balls and the rest black or yellow (exact proportions
unknown). They were then given tho set of options, each paying different amount
depending on which ball is drawn. These were as follows:
 Problem 1:
– Option X: Win $100 if a red ball is drawn, nothing otherwise.
– Option Y: Win $100 if a black ball is drawn, nothing otherwise.
 Problem 2:
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– Option V: Win $100 if a red or a yellow ball is drawn, nothing otherwise.
– Option W: Win $100 if a black a yellow ball is drawn, nothing otherwise.
Most subjects choose Option X in the first problem, and option W in the second.
However, once again, one can show that this pattern of choices is inconsistent with
expected utility. To see this, let us suppose that the probability of drawing a black
ball is given by some (unknown) number p and the probability of drawing a yellow
ball is given by q, with p + q = 2
3
. Then if the Option X is preferred to option Y,
we have by expected utility argument
1
3
u(100) + pu(0) + qu(0) >
1
3
u(0) + pu(100) + qu(0) (A.2.3.1)
which reduces to
1
3
u(100) + pu(0) >
1
3
u(0) + pu(100) (A.2.3.2)
In addition, if Option W is preferred to Option V, we have
1
3
u(100) + pu(0) + qu(100) <
1
3
u(0) + pu(100) + qu(100) (A.2.3.3)
which, in turn, reduces to
1
3
u(100) + pu(0) <
1
3
u(0) + pu(100) (A.2.3.4)
It is clear that (A.2.3.2) and (A.2.3.4) cannot be true at the same time, regardless of
the unknown probabilities involved and the particular form of the utility function.
The key point here is that the LHS of the inequality (A.2.3.1) differs from the
LHS of the inequality in (A.2.3.3) only in the q term, and the same is true for
the corresponding RHS. However, although the q term itself is different between
the two problems, it is the same for the purposes of comparing the two choices in
each problem, and so must be removed from consideration. Once it is so removed,
it becomes clear that we must either prefer X to Y and V to W, or Y to X and
W to V. This is actually a particular case of a general principle known as the
independence of irrelevant alternatives. It is a direct consequence of the expected
utility theory and is clearly rational - if some outcome is the same in all states of
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the world, then it cannot possibly influence the choices we make. 1 The results of
the experiment can conceivably be explained in terms of avoidance on the part of
the subjects of the unknown probabilities. In Problem 1, Option X produces a win
of $100 with a “known” probability of 1
3
, whereas the probability of winning the
same amount under Option Y seems “unknown” - it can be anything from 0 to 2
3
.
Similarly, in Problem 2, Option W allows to win $100 with a “known” probability
of 2
3
(since one will win that amount if either black or yellow is drawn), while the
chance of winning with Option V can be anything from 1
3
to 1.
1Incidentally, most of the subjects in this experiment were economists.
Appendix B
Modelling Wealth Distribution
Wealth (and income) distributions in real life often exhibit power-law behaviour.
For this reason, one of the more natural candidates for a theoretical distribution
that models wealth is the Pareto distribution.
Recall that the Pareto distribution, defined for a range of positive real values
[xm,∞) (where xm > 0 is the minimum attainable value) has density function
f(x) =
αxαM
xα+1
(B.0.3.1)
and distribution function
F (x) = 1−
(xm
x
)α
(B.0.3.2)
where α > 0 is the distribution shape parameter, with smaller values of α produc-
ing distributions with longer tail.
Although wealth distribution modelling is not the main focus of this research,
we would still like to assign initial cash positions to the agents in the model in
a realistic way. While the choice of the minimum value for our agents’ wealth
distribution was more or less arbitrary (we set xm = 10000 in all simulation cases
considered), we felt it was important to come up with a sensible value for α, since
that effectively controls the inequity in the wealth distribution. To this end we
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analysed data from the UN global study of household wealth and income Davies
et al. (2006). It should be pointed out the study cited does not directly estimate
Pareto distribution parameters, instead it looks at the Gini coefficient, which is
a non-distribution-specific measure of wealth inequality. This coefficient is ar-
rived at by first defining the so-called Lorenz curve. This is defined for a generic
(continuous) wealth distribution as
L(u) =
∫ F−1(u)
xm
xf(x)dx∫ +∞
xm
xf(x)dx
(B.0.3.3)
where u ∈ [0, 1] and F−1(·) is the inverse distribution function (quantile function).
The value of the Lorenz curve at u is interpreted as the proportion of the distri-
bution assumed by the bottom u× 100% of its values. Note that the Lorenz curve
maps a unit interval to a unit interval. For a perfectly equal wealth distribution
the Lorenz curve is a straight line from (0, 0) to (1, 1). The Gini coefficient is then
used to measure the degree to which the observed wealth distribution departs from
perfect equality. This is defined as
G = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
L(u)du (B.0.3.4)
For Pareto distribution we have that
G =
1
2α− 1 (B.0.3.5)
Applying (B.0.3.5) to the values of Gini coefficient report in Davies et al. (2006)
we found estimated values of α range from approximately 1.1 to 1.4, with mean
at 1.2. We consequently decided to use the value 1.4 for the wealth distribution
in our reference case as the least inequitable of those estimated.
To estimate the inequity in the terminal wealth distribution we used the max-
imum likelihood approach. Given a sample x1, . . . , xn the maximum likelihood
estimators of Pareto distribution parameters are given by
xˆm = min(x1, . . . , xn) (B.0.3.6)
αˆ =
n∑n
i=1 (lnxi − ln xˆm)
(B.0.3.7)
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Additionally the estimation error of αˆ is given by
ǫ(αˆ) =
αˆ√
n
(B.0.3.8)
Appendix C
Implementation overview
Here, we will briefly describe the actual implementation of our model.
The main bulk of the code used to carry out the simulations was written in C++.
This was organised in four libraries:
 libglooper: the library implementing our agent-based model
 Auxiliary libraries:
– librng: the random number generation library
– libxml serialisation: the library used to represent objects in XML-
like format (needed for recording the state of various simulation-related
objects)
– libcallback log: the logging library
The simulation parameters are configured via the means of Python1 and Lua2
script files. A Python launcher script is then used to pass the initial parameters
to the core library and run the simulation.
As the simulation unfolds, states of various objects that are created or altered
1www.python.org
2www.lua.org
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are recorded in hard disk files. Information that is saved in this way includes the
following:
 All trades
 All orders (both limit and market), as well as order cancellations
 Initial agent population
 Agent population at the end of every simulation step
 Limit order book at the end of every simulation step
 Simulation-specific data (number of runs, number of time steps, type of
public information generator etc.)
Simulation-specific data is stored in an XML file, while trade, order agent and
limit order book data is organised in flat CSV files for convenience.
The CSV files are then post-processed by a series of R scripts (R Development
Core Team (2009)) to extract simulation data, compute the various run-specific
estimates (e.g. Hill indices, autocorrelation functions etc.), average those estimates
across runs and produce graphs and tables for subsequent use.
The basic structure of the model implementation used in this thesis is given in
Figure C.1 (p. 168)
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Figure C.1: Basic Model Implementation Structure
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